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How has the treatment of marine-based, Article XX exception trade 
disputes differed between the GATT and the WTO? 
 
This paper uses a comparative case-study methodology to analyse two 
marine-based, Article XX exceptions cases: one each brought before the dispute 
resolution mechanisms of the GATT and WTO respectively. This research is driven 
by a desire to gain some insight into what happens when the imperatives of 
liberalised trade confront the interests of environmental protection, and also, to 
examine the similarities and differences between GATT and the WTO. Trade-
restrictive measures (embargoes) imposed on a trading partner in the name of 
environmental protection – measures claiming the protection offered under the 
Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions of the GATT – form the essence of each dispute; 
but it is the purpose of the paper to ascertain whether the mechanism under 
which the dispute is heard (either GATT 1947 or WTO/GATT1994) had an impact 
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Chapter 1: Background and Research Question 
Background to Thesis 
The growth of international trade since the signing of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 has been, until the recent global economic crisis, 
sustained and dramatic.1 Interest in protecting the environment has also grown 
substantially since the 1960s as evidenced by academic literature, social 
movements, books, laws and environmental organisations2 and numerous UN 
conferences starting with the UN Conference of Human Environment held in 
Stockholm in 1972. As international trade affects global patterns of production and 
resource consumption which impacts upon the environment3 the inevitable tension 
at the intersection of international trade and environmental protection remains a 
highly contested area and forms the general context of this paper; thus the 
different sides of the debate will be briefly sketched below. 
The trade-environment nexus 
The free trade argument posits that theoretically liberalisation of trade and 
protection of the environment are not antithetical goals; both are fundamentally an 
attempt to optimise the use of resources.4 This is achieved by countries exploiting 
their comparative advantage, i.e. by specialising in the sector or industry in which 
                                                     
1
 According to statistics available from http://stat.wto.org/ imports increased from US$62000 to 
US$12380000(millions) and exports increased from US$58000 to US$12062000(millions) in 
current prices between 1948 & 2006. 
2
 Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT. Trade, Environment and the Future,  (Washington: Institute for 
International Economics, 1994), p.37 
3
 Kevin Watkins, Fixing the rules. North-South issues in International Trade and the GATT Uruguay 
Round, (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1992), p.98 
4
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they most efficiently use factor endowments or resources.5 Comparative advantage 
is thus interpreted as aiding environmental sustainability.6 The argument has two 
primary facets: one, that growth through trade generates wealth which can be used 
to address more environmental issues; and two that market forces, allowed to work 
properly, will directly protect the environment by internalising the costs of 
environmental impacts.7 These arguments, when layered on top of the existing neo-
liberal principle that trade makes all participants wealthy and helps people coexist 
peacefully,8 help to entrench the existing international trading regime. 
The concern of environmental protagonists however, is that the unfettered 
operation of comparative advantage may, under certain conditions, promote 
environmentally destructive production. The market fails when it does not properly 
value environmental goods with the result that business or the public do not pay 
the full cost of production or consumption.9 This may have several causes: full costs 
(including environmental damage) may not have been incorporated into the price 
(have been externalised); the value society places on the environment may not 
have been accounted for; a lack of defined property rights creates a tendency for 
overuse – the so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’; or the market itself may not 
exist.10 Under these conditions, trade could potentially promote the production and 
consumption of environmentally damaging products: this is what prompts 
                                                     
5
 Matthew A. Cole, Trade Liberalisation, Economic Growth and the Environment, (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2000), p.25 
6
 Duncan Brack, ‘Balancing Trade and the Environment’, International Affairs, 71.3(1995), 497-
514,(p.498) 
7
 Esty, Greening the GATT, 63 
8
 This concept will be explored in more depth in chapter two. 
9
 Esty, Greening the GATT, 66 
10
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environmentalists to call for limitations on trade.11 Specifically the four main points 
generally forwarded to support the argument for regulation are: the finite capacity 
of the earth’s sources and sinks;12 the possibility that a lack of regulation may create 
‘Pollution Havens’;13 the overruling by the WTO of sovereign states’ attempts at 
environmental conservation14 and the necessity of having trade restrictions 
available as enforcement mechanisms for environmental agreements.15 
Sovereignty, GATT and the WTO 
Historically, and theoretically, the Westphalian16 system of states has 
recognised the sovereignty of national states wherein matters like economic and 
environmental policy fell into the ambit of the domestic decision-making structure 
of an autonomous government (with some exceptions).  The conclusion of 
multilateral agreements like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 
1947 and establishment of organisations like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
on January 1st 1995, however, have to some extent curtailed autonomous action by 
requiring states to conform to generally agreed principles of international trade. 
That said writers like Hopkins, Puchula and Hedley Bull posit that even under these 
                                                     
11
 Gary P. Sampson, Trade, Environment, and the WTO: The Post-Seattle Agenda, (Washington: 
Overseas Development Council, 2000), p.27 
12
 Donella Meadows et al, Limits to Growth. The 30-Year Update, (London: Earthscan, 2006)  
13
 Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable Development: A 
Commentary’, The American Journal of International Law, 86.4(1992), 728-735, (p,729) 
14
 Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners, 730 and Esty, Greening the GATT, 94 
15
 Esty, Greening the GATT, 51 
16
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conditions there remains a ‘diffuse principle’ of the recognition of sovereignty as a 
“constitutive principle of International Relations”.17 
Thus increasing global interdependence has brought with it a peculiar set of 
challenges for sovereign states: even as the prevailing wisdom in economic circles 
emphasizes that openness to other economies in the form of liberalised trade 
brings economic growth and prosperity to people,18 so the increasingly widespread 
interest in and concern for the environment evident in society in the latter half of 
the 20th century has sometimes prompted states to take actions which could be 
construed as unilateral, hampering liberalised trade and therefore undermining the 
international trading regime.  
The 1980s and 1990s also saw an increasing awareness by individual states of 
the inability of politically imposed territorial borders to stop environmental 
problems and the need for coordinated international action to address such issues 
as a unilateral solution would be both costly and ineffective. A case in point would 
be the worldwide acknowledgement that the hole in the ozone layer over 
Antarctica was caused by the widespread use of Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs – used 
at the time as a refrigerant and to make Styrofoam) and the necessity of 
coordinated international efforts to phase out their use which began with the 
creation of the Montreal Protocol in 1987.19 
                                                     
17
 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.8-9 & 70 in Stephen D. Krasner , ‘Structural Causes and 
Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, International Organization, 36.2 
(Spring 1982), 185-205 (p.202) 
18
 Amrita Narlikar, The World Trade Organization: A very short introduction, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) p.2 
19
 Elizabeth Kolbert, Field notes from a catastrophe. A frontline report on Climate Change, (London: 
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The Research Question 
The impetus for this analysis in this paper is thus twofold: one, a desire to gain 
some insight into what happens when the imperatives of liberalised trade confront 
the interests of environmental protection, and two, to examine the similarities and 
differences between GATT and the WTO. The very brief introduction above provides 
an indication of the impossibility of tackling both these subjects within the confines 
of a short thesis. The broad scope of these interests necessitates a much more 
focused approach, thus this paper will take the form of a comparative case study of 
two marine-based, GATT Article XX disputes: one each brought before the dispute 
resolution mechanisms of the GATT and WTO respectively. At the heart of each 
dispute are trade-restrictive measures imposed on a trading partner in the name of 
environmental protection – measures invoked under Article XX(b) and (g) 
exceptions of the GATT. Thus the research question is how the treatment of marine-
based, Article XX exception trade disputes has differed between the GATT and the 
WTO.  
The comparative case study approach, it is hoped, will provide an opportunity 
for analysis in order to isolate both the environmental implications of disputes 
between states engaged in trade and the differences between the GATT trading 
regime and the regime and organization combination of the WTO.   
Chapter Overview 
The remainder of this paper will be divided into four chapters as follows.  
Chapter two will begin with a discussion of case selection and methodology 
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organizations in order to establish the theoretical framework to be used throughout 
the subsequent chapters of this paper. The theoretical aspect of this chapter will 
begin with a discussion of regime theory and criticisms thereof. Next it will analyse 
GATT as a regime using Stephen Krasner’s well-established definition in order to 
demonstrate how, in the broadest sense, regimes regulate, manage and distribute 
the costs of conducting trans-national transactions.20 A discussion of regime 
formation and functioning is crucial to understand why and how states cooperated 
to create the GATT as the original multilateral trading regime. The chapter will also 
introduce the WTO as an international organisation underpinned by the GATT 
regime, but distinguishable from it. 
 The theoretical assumptions of regime theory will also inform the discussion of 
why trade disputes arise between states. This is necessary to set up the analytical 
framework within which to compare and contrast the treatment of the similar 
marine-based Article XX disputes under the regime of GATT and the organisation of 
the WTO. Thereafter the chapter will examine whether or why the addition of an 
environmental ‘angle’ to trade disputes may complicate matters further.  
Chapter three and four are the case studies. Each chapter will discuss how the 
dispute arose and interrogate the disputants, their claims, the rulings and reaction 
thereto by the disputants and the public. Most importantly these chapters will 
conclude by analysing the impact, if any of the respective decisions on 
jurisprudence of the trading regime in relation to the GATT Article XX exceptions. 
Chapter three will consider the Article XX dispute heard by the GATT panels; The 
                                                     
20
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United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (DS21/R), more informally known as 
Tuna-Dolphin I and II. The following chapter will consider the WTO dispute; United 
States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (DS58), more 
commonly called the Shrimp-Turtle case. This chapter will not include an in-depth 
analysis of the 2001 Shrimp-Turtle II case, however, because that appeal was based 
on GATT’s Article 21(5) concerning the United States’ activities to comply with the 
1998 appeal ruling and does not directly invoke an Article XX exception and is thus 
not applicable to the research question. Both case studies are essentially about the 
environmentally problematic issue of ‘bycatch’ – which will be defined in the 
beginning of chapter three - and the concerns with unilateral action within a 
multilateral regime. 
Chapter five is an analysis and comparison of the two case studies presented in 
chapters three and four. It will present some conclusions pertaining to the 
similarities and differences of the approaches to the disputes by the regime and the 
organisation. To do so this chapter will draw on all the rulings and the considerable 
debate amongst scholars to compare and contrast what these say about the 
respective approaches of the GATT and WTO to marine-based Article XX exception 
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Chapter 2: Methodology and Conceptual Framework 
Chapter one contextualised the research topic by sketching the background and 
the ‘meta-interests’ which informed the selection of the topic. This chapter will first 
deal with the methodology of the paper and then discuss the selection of the case 
studies. Thereafter the chapter will set up the theoretical framework for the 
remainder of the paper. First it will define the relevant concepts of regimes and 
international organizations; second, it will provide a discussion of the criticisms of 
regime theory before providing an analysis of GATT as an international regime. 
As noted in chapter one, the concerns which underpin this paper are twofold: a 
desire to gain some insight into what happens when the imperatives of liberalised 
trade confront the interests of environmental protection, and two, to examine the 
similarities and differences between the GATT and WTO treatment of these issues. 
Given the need to limit the scope of the paper the key research question is how the 
treatment of marine-based, Article XX exception trade disputes has differed 
between the GATT and the WTO. This formulation allows analysis of the differences 
between the treatment of environmental protection mechanisms by the regime and 
the regime supplemented by the organization.  
Research Methodology 
This analysis takes the form of a comparative case study. The case study 
methodology is an in-depth contextual analysis of a single set of events, group of 
people, or similar related or grouped phenomena. These case studies involve 
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panels as well as the legal documents constituting the GATT and WTO – and 
secondary sources in the form of academic journals and books. The paper will use 
states as its level of analysis because the both GATT and the WTO are state-centric 
and membership is limited to states to the exclusion of civil-society groups, 
International (or national) Non-Governmental Organizations or trans-national 
corporations.  
This qualitative method has been selected because it is well suited to the 
examination of explanatory ‘how’ questions such as the one posed by this paper of 
how the treatment of the two disputes differed between the GATT and the WTO.1 
The comparative method is used as it is “regarded as a method of discovering 
empirical relationships among variables”2 and is thus useful in establishing links 
(should there be any) between the differences in outcomes of the two case studies 
and whether the dispute was heard by GATT or the WTO. 
By providing researchers with “tools with which to study complex phenomena 
within their context”3 the case study methodology facilitates analysis of why a 
decision was taken, how it was arrived at and what the consequences were.4 
Furthermore, this approach is particularly helpful when the phenomenon being 
analysed (the treatment of marine-based Article XX exception disputes) and the 
context within which it occurs (international trade regime) are difficult to separate 
                                                     
1
 Robert K, Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods. 3
rd
 ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 
2003), p.6 
2
 Arend Lijphart, ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’, The American Political Science 
Review, 65.3 (1971), 682-693 ( p.683) 
3
 Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study design and 
implementation for novice researchers, The Qualitative Report, 13.4(2008),544-559 (p.544) 
4
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and the analysis should also include the context itself.5 Thus one of the notable 
strengths of this methodology is the ability to explore and analyse in depth, 
whereas its drawback is a lack of breadth (of the type associated with studies of 
large samples – ‘n’).6  
According to conventional wisdom amongst researchers one of the limitations 
of this methodology is that the outcome of the analysis cannot be used to 
generalise too widely7, if at all8, because it is based on too small a sample of original 
data (a very small ‘n’). Additionally, this methodology does not offer replicable 
results in the manner of a scientific experiment.9 These two limitations – not 
facilitating generalisation and not producing replicable outcomes – have been taken 
together to prove that the scientific ‘credentials’ of the case study methodology are 
‘ambiguous’ at best.10 Yin, however, disputes this position contending that case 
studies, like experiments, are ‘generalizable’ to theoretical propositions and 
constitute a form of analytic generalisation even if the generalisation does not 
extend to those about populations, universal measurements or enumerate 
frequencies of the type generated by statistical generalisations.11 
Some social scientists have also proposed a hierarchy of research methods in 
which the case study methodology is only appropriate for the exploratory phase of 
research or investigation and not for the more ‘elevated’ uses of the descriptive or 
                                                     
5
 Yin, Case Study Research, 5 
6
 Bent Flyvbjerg, Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research,  Qualitative Inquiry, 
12.2(2006), 219-245 (p.241 ) 
7
 Gina Wisker, The Postgraduate Research Handbook. 2
nd
 ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 
p.216 
8
  Lijphart, Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, 691 
9
  Schramm, Notes on Case Studies, 10 
10
 Lijphart, op.cit. 
11
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explanatory phases of research.12 This hierarchical view though persisting, has been 
vigorously disputed13 in more recent literature on research methods.  The case 
study methodology should not be confused with standard qualitative research. 
Whilst frequently used in conjunction with it, case studies can incorporate both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods.14  
Cognisant of both the debate on the strengths and limitations of the case study 
methodology this paper has adopted it in order to describe the two disputes and 
attempt an explanatory analysis of the differences and similarities between the two 
dispute decisions. The decision is also borne of an understanding that meticulously 
executed case studies may well provide exemplars in a discipline, without which a 
discipline becomes less effective in uncovering and elucidating ideas and 
concepts.15 
Case Study Selection 
The usefulness and validity of the comparative methodology is perforce 
dependant on the cases which are selected for comparison. Two key problems may 
surface in the use of comparative methodology – that of having too many variables 
and of having too few cases.16 One method which addresses the latter problem is to 
focus the analysis on ‘comparable’ cases. Comparable in this specific instance 
means that cases have many characteristics which are similar and which can 
therefore be treated as ‘constants’, yet have one/some characteristics sufficiently 
                                                     
12
 Yin, Case Study Research, 3 
13
 Ibid and Flyvbjerg, Five Misunderstandings, 219-245 
14
 Yin, Case Study Research, 15-16 
15
 Thomas, S. Kuhn, ‘What are scientific revolutions?’, in The probabilistic revolution, Vol. 1: Ideas in 
history, ed. by Kruger, Daston, & Heidelberger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), pp.7-22 
16
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different which one can compare and relate to each other (across cases).17 Such 
comparable cases allow the researcher to establish some control over many 
variables whilst isolating one/a few in order to establish whether relationships exist 
between the variables that differ – this may also allow the discovery of partial 
generalizations in a field of inquiry.18  
It is with this in mind that these two marine-based disputes: The United States - 
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (DS21/R) and United States – Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (DS58), have been selected as the case studies. 
Firstly, the similarities in the details (‘variables’) of the disputes make them ideal for 
comparison. The disputes both arose out of attempts by one state to take 
environmentally protective actions which other states then claimed infringed their 
multilateral trading regime ‘rights’. The respondent in both disputes used as their 
main defence that their actions were permissible under Articles (b) and (g) of the 
General Exceptions of GATT (1947 & 1994). Both disputes concern protective 
measures ostensibly applied to protect marine ‘resources’ which were not the main 
object of the trade19 – dolphins are not harvested for trade, the tuna are & shrimp 
are the intended harvest, not sea turtles - and not within the disputants’ jurisdiction 
i.e. pelagic marine animals. These case studies straddle GATT (1947) and the 
creation of the WTO in 1995 (GATT 1994) and as they occurred relatively close in 
time (1991 and 1998) a comparison of these disputes goes some way in isolating 
regime change as a variable because other potential variables (e.g. large-scale 
                                                     
17




 Article XX exceptions have been invoked in other marine cases like the 1998 “Canada: Measures 
Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon”, however the resource for which 
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changes in public conscience and multiple government turnovers) are less likely and 
therefore less significant.  
These dispute case studies differ in that the disputes were heard by different 
dispute resolution mechanisms – one by an ad-hoc GATT panel and one the 
legalistic mechanism set up by the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO. 
The similarities can thus be ‘controlled’ to enable an analysis of the differences.  
In addition, these two case studies were chosen because marine disputes are 
analytically interesting as they concern matters of the ‘global commons’ – an area 
which is thematically important to the understanding of how and why states do or 
do not cooperate; this will be discussed more fully later in this chapter. 
Furthermore, the decisions in both these disputes were highly contentious when 
they were first published and served to bring the trade-environment debate into 
sharper focus for the public – people in turtle suits frequently make appearances at 
anti-globalisation demonstrations20 - and academic and policy-making communities.   
These two disputes are sui generis in the combination of the factors outlined 
above which makes them ideal for a comparative case study which may shed some 
light on the differences between the treatment of environmental protection 
mechanisms under the GATT and WTO. The disputes are also representative of 
larger issues and it is the aim of this paper to forward some tentative conclusions in 
this regard in the final chapter. 
                                                     
20
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Regimes 
This analysis of how the treatment of marine-based Article XX disputes has 
differed between the GATT and the WTO will proceed with a few brief historical 
comments in order to contextualise the genesis of the GATT and the need for 
cooperation. Having identified the need for cooperation, this paper will discuss the 
theoretical foundations of regime theory – including major criticisms – and 
distinguish regimes from international organizations, before undertaking an analysis 
of GATT as a regime. Most importantly, given that the case studies to follow 
concern disputes, the chapter will continue with a comparison of dispute resolution 
mechanisms of GATT and WTO and then apply all of this information to inform the 
discussion of the genesis of trade disputes and whether (and why) the 
environmental dimension complicates trade disputes. 
Background: The Genesis of GATT 
Prior to World War One international trading relations consisted of a web of bi-
lateral trade agreements that were neither centrally regulated nor the result of 
multilateral cooperation. Countries were free to set their own tariff codes providing 
these adhered to the most favoured nation concept.21 Trade flourished during this 
period as it was subject to very few non-tariff barriers (NTBs, e.g. quantitative 
restrictions or exchange controls) - whilst trade barriers consisted almost entirely of 
                                                     
21
 Caplin A. & Krishna, K., ‘Tariffs and the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause; A game-theoretic approach’, 
in The WTO’s Core Rules and Disciplines, Volume I. ed. by Kym Anderson and Bernard Hoekman 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), 329-352 (p.329). Meaning to extend to a trading partner a 
tariff rate on the same commodity at least as low as that extended to any other trading partner. 
This concept goes back as far as the 13
th
 Century when Emperor Fredrick II extended the same 
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tariffs.22 The outbreak of World War One in 1914 ended the consensus of the 
network system and brought with it an increase in tariffs and a range of non-tariff 
barriers that become entrenched in the interactions of states.  With no strong 
institution or political will to enforce the rolling back of these changes, and the 
increase of protectionism and ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, the inter-war period saw a dramatic slump in international 
trade and the world economy in general.23 This situation can be modelled as the 
classic prisoner’s dilemma game: unfettered trade provides benefits for all states, 
but each state’s optimal strategy actually involves cheating (unilaterally erecting 
trade barriers of some kind for instance). This benefit only accrues to one state for 
as long as the other states don’t do the same thing; but since the cheating option is 
the optimal strategy for each one, the moment they do cheat the collective 
outcome is decidedly sub-optimal24 - this was the lesson learnt from the inter-war 
years. 
Cognisant of the costs of the collective economic failure of the inter-war period 
Allied states – notably the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) - began 
negotiating during the later stages of WWII to bring about an agreement to 
facilitate the liberalisation of trade. Eventually over 50 states participated in the 
negotiations which culminated in the conclusion of the Havana Charter in 1947 to 
establish the International Trade Organisation (ITO) as a specialised agency of the 
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United Agency.25 Had the US Congress ratified the Charter and the ITO come into 
fruition, it would have completed the triumvirate of Bretton Woods institutions 
intended to place the world economy on a sound footing, taking its place next to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD- commonly termed the World Bank). These three 
institutions were to be the foundation of post World War Two reconstruction and 
ultimately intended to prevent a recurrence of war through the promotion of 
economic ties and free trade between states.26 The collapse of the ITO lay in the 
broadness of its proposed mandate - which included restrictive government 
practises, intergovernmental commodity agreements and economic reconstruction 
and development27- and the long list of exceptions to it that the multilateral 
negotiations produced. In trying to pacify both liberalised-trade and protectionist 
interests, it satisfied neither.28  
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was originally a relatively minor 
part of the commercial policy chapter of the Havana Charter and was negotiated in 
1947 as a multilateral treaty focussed solely on tariff reduction on goods traded 
between signatories to serve as an interim arrangement underpinning multilateral 
cooperation until the ITO was established.29 The objective, contained in the 
preamble, was the elimination of discrimination in trade between contracting 
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parties.30 The interim Agreement that came into force in January 1948 was to 
provide the basis for the international trading system for the next 47 years – in so 
doing it was effectively transformed from a temporary agreement into a normative 
umbrella under which states negotiated tariff reductions and multilateral trade 
policy.31 
This brief history is intended to contextualise the realisation by powerful states 
– like the US and UK - that cooperation with others was the key to building a regime 
which would facilitate outcomes which they couldn’t achieve unilaterally. Whether 
these states followed this path to overcome obstacles to collaboration (liberal 
institutionalist view) or to use their power capabilities on a greater audience of 
states in order to influence the nature and distribution of costs and benefits of the 
regime (realist view) is a causal question beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
common assumptions made by these opposing schools of thought in international 
relations are a useful introduction to a more theoretical understanding of regime 
formation.  Both schools believe that states operate in an anarchic (without ruler) 
system as rational and unitary actors; states, therefore, are responsible for 
establishing regimes; furthermore, regimes are established through cooperation 
and to promote international order.32 
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Regimes: a definition 
This section will provide a brief discussion of regime theory as it pertains to why 
states cooperate (or not). It will then discuss the critiques of regime theory by 
reviewing a well-known article by Susan Strange, before going on to discuss how 
regimes differ from international organizations. 
Regime Theory, or Regime Analysis as it is sometimes referred to, is a theory of 
international politics, which, like many others has attempted to construct a 
comprehensible and simplified ‘version’ of reality or a part thereof in order to 
explain, describe and hypothesize about that reality.33 Regime theory’s genesis was 
in the 1980s in the United States (US) and fundamentally posits that regimes are 
intervening variables between causal factors (like power, interests and values) and 
outcomes and behaviours.34 Thus regime theory is used in this paper to analyse 
what effect the existence of the regime – GATT – had on the dispute between the 
US and Mexico, and how this differed from the dispute (between the US and 
Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Thailand) in a context where the regime had been 
supplemented by an international organization – the WTO. 
Over time governments have created or accepted procedures and rules to 
govern specific activities where interdependence is unavoidable, necessary or 
beneficial. These governing arrangements are international regimes.35 This paper 
will use Stephen Krasner’s now well established definition of ‘regimes’ as being  
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…a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area 
of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and 
rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and 
obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. 
Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and 
implementing collective choice.36 
Using these four characteristics the paper will sketch the outlines of the GATT 
and the WTO. First, however, it is worth noting that although some writers like 
Finlayson and Zacher consider GATT to be only part of the broader post-WWII 
trading regime because it was so narrow in scope,37 other writers consider it to be a 
regime and only differentiate between the GATT and the WTO in terms of the level 
of institutionalisation and convergence of expectations.38 Where there are no 
formal agreements or converging expectations, there is no regime; as agreements 
are reached and expectations converge, a regime is the outcome. Thus a regime can 
be associated with merely a highly formalised agreement - like the GATT – and also 
with the creation of an international organization like the WTO. 
An in-depth discussion and debate of the merits of the different analytic 
standpoints on the formation of regimes is beyond the scope of this question, and 
thus this paper admittedly takes a liberal institutionalist position rather than a 
realist/structural or modified structural position. The liberal institutionalist position 
avers that regimes are a fundamental and pervasive characteristic of an 
international system in which continued patterned behaviour must transmute into a 
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regime in order to be sustained.39 In common with most theories, however, Regime 
Theory is contested, and this paper will now consider the critique thereof by Susan 
Strange, one of the most outspoken critics. 
Susan Strange vs. Regime Theory 
Susan Strange has five criticisms of regime analysis (as she terms it). Her first is 
that it represents yet another ‘academic fad’ which in the long term would 
contribute little to knowledge, but which in the short-term diverts young scientists 
from other, presumably more worthwhile, academic pursuits.40 Furthermore, she 
claims it is a product of the historical moment (the Oil shocks, Watergate, the 
perceived ‘decline’ of American hegemony, etc) in which US academics found 
themselves at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s.41 She contends that as a theory 
it is both ‘woolly’ and imprecise being stretched in meaning until it is rendered 
meaningless.42 She also finds the use of the term ‘regime’ problematic because she 
claims it infers a kind of disciplined organization, a central locus of authority and 
regularity of behaviour; all of which are present in regimes at a state level, but 
absent in regimes at international level.43 Next she points to what she interprets as 
value-bias claiming that regime analysts assume things that should not be assumed, 
for instance that the desire for order is a universal impetus.44 Her fourth criticism is 
that “it distorts by overemphasizing the static and underemphasizing the dynamic 
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element of change in world politics”45 because for instance, it doesn’t take into 
account, and isn’t able to deal with, the key drivers of technology and markets and 
the effects these have on institutions.46 Lastly Strange criticises what she calls the 
narrowness induced by the state-centric nature of regime analysis as having the 
potential to blind academics to those aspects of international relations that lie 
outside the realm of regimes.47 
Taking into account these criticisms, this paper has nevertheless opted to use 
regime theory as the theoretical basis for the following reasons. Regime Theory 
offers a framework within in which to analyse macro level interactions between 
states. Furthermore, the use of Regime Theory enables this paper to examine how 
much the level of institutionalism influences the output of the regime itself. This 
addresses the second of the aforementioned underlying interests: the similarities 
and differences of GATT and the WTO.  
Far from just being an academic ‘fad’ which arose from a particular historical 
moment, Regime Theory is now an established tool for analysing rule-governed 
interactions between states in specific issue-areas. It is particularly prevalent in the 
area of global environmental governance (climate change is an example) and within 
the broader debate of the trade-environment nexus where the discussion 
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frequently centres on the overlap of the international trade regime with an 
(admittedly less well defined and institutionalized) environmental regime.48 
Given the relative novelty (in 1982) of Regime Theory as a subset in the study of 
international relations, Strange’s criticism concerning the ‘wooliness’ and 
imprecision of the theory, seems rather harsh, though not (at the time) unfounded. 
In the nearly three decades since, Regime Theory has been honed with use and 
application by academics and theorists as is usual with any new conceptual theory.   
This paper acknowledges Susan Strange’s criticism that Regime Theory 
potentially facilitates academic emphasis on regimes to the exclusion of other 
aspects of international relations (states acting alone, or other types of trans-
national authorities) or of areas in which states interact but no regime exists.  
However, as the question posed by the paper focuses on the very narrowly 
delineated arena of the interactions (in the form of disputes) between states within 
a regime, this focus does not pose a problem for this paper. 
International Organization: a brief definition 
As this paper has just demonstrated above classifying concepts in politics is an 
academic exercise fraught with difficulty as these and the terms used are frequently 
highly contested. Even a concept as seemingly simple as ‘the state’ has differing 
definitions depending on who is wielding the term and can variously mean a legal 
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abstraction, political community or a government.49 Cognisant of these challenges, 
this paper must perforce, however, adopt definitions in order to proceed with the 
analysis. 
Most broadly defined an international organization (IO) is any institution with 
formal rules and procedures and a membership of three or more states.50 More 
specifically the WTO could be termed an Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) 
which is a type of IO established by treaty, in which full legal membership is only 
open to states, with decision-making authority invested in government 
representatives and which takes the form of consent and cooperation, has both a 
broadly representative consultative or negotiating forum and a permanent 
secretariat (bureaucracy) ensuring the continuous management of the 
organization.51 Sessions or sittings of such organizations provide manifest structures 
for multilateral political communication.52 The WTO surpasses in scope (about 25 
000 pages which includes a preamble, 16 articles and 4 annexes incorporating 29 
agreements – one of which is GATT 1994) and purpose any previous international 
set of rules for governance of major transactions.53 Furthermore the WTO has a 
formal legal personality as asserted in Articles I and VIII(1) of the ‘Agreement 
Establishing The World Trade Organization’ and is invested, like all bureaucracies 
according to Max Weber, with a rational-legal character which imbues it with a 
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form of authority independent of the delegated authority conferred by the 
constituent states.54  
In contrast the GATT was little more than a negotiating forum held together 
over a number of years by an agreement signed by contracting parties. The 
provisional, non-organisational structure of the GATT involved minimal costs of 
participation, which may have helped to extend the life span of the ‘provisional’ 
regime.55 Any collective action was undertaken by the CONTRACTING PARTIES,56 
which were distinguishable from members of an organisation.  Analyst Gilbert 
Winham described the GATT as a “formally-contracted, rule oriented, non-
organizational form of cooperation in international affairs”57 which is in contrast to 
the description of the WTO as the “the common institutional framework” found in 
Article II(1) of the ‘Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization’. 
With the definitions of regimes and organizations for the purposes of this paper 
now delineated this paper will now apply the definition of a regime to the GATT in 
more detail in order to set the theoretical foundation for the GATT case study in the 
following chapter. Thereafter the paper will briefly discuss the different dispute 
resolution mechanisms of GATT and the WTO in order to set up the comparative 
analysis which will take place in the final chapter of the paper. 
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Application: The GATT as regime: principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures. 
Principle: trade makes us wealthier and helps us get along. 
The guiding principle that underpins both the GATT and the WTO is that 
economic liberalism and expansion of free trade produce global welfare benefits – 
this is its raison d’être.58 This is a theoretical statement about how the world works, 
and is clearly elucidated in both the preamble to the GATT 194759 and again in the 
Marrakesh Agreement60 establishing the WTO. This guiding principle is a 
contentious61 concept of long-standing most commonly associated with the liberal 
school of thought which posits that trade promotes peace. Cordell Hull, the US 
Secretary of State between 1933-1944, encapsulated this idea perfectly in this 
statement, “I reasoned that if we could get a freer flow of trade ... so that … the 
living standards of all countries might rise, thereby eliminating the economic 
dissatisfaction that breeds war, we might have a reasonable chance of lasting 
peace.”62  Karl W. Deutsch proposed the idea that trade is a form of cultural 
exchange that increases a sense of community and interaction between states 
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which fosters the peaceful resolution of disputes.63 The liberal conception of trade 
and wealth as a variable-sum interaction has become the dominant idea of the 
latter half of the 20th Century; this means that states’ trade and wealth are 
positively correlated and improvement for one means improvement for many, 
possibly all.64 
Norms: Non-discrimination and reciprocity 
The norm of non-discrimination is the lynchpin which allows multilateralism to 
function in the trading regimes of both GATT and the WTO.65 In the early years of 
GATT it was regarded as the crucial norm; indeed unanimous consent was required 
to change this norm. In the years since however, it has been gradually eroded by 
regional trade arrangements – which are discriminatory to those not within the 
region – the growth of Voluntary Export Restraints, and by preferential trade 
agreements between developed countries and Less Developed Countries (LDCs).66 
The non-discrimination norm is necessary to create a trading environment in which 
goods can compete on a ‘level playing field’ unimpeded by preferential treatment.67 
Reciprocity is an essential standard of behaviour if competing states are to 
achieve any sort of cooperation;68 equally it is an important concept that has been 
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the cornerstone of international trade for over 150 years.69 In 1986 Keohane 
posited that the GATT negotiators had built an intermediate, hybrid form of 
reciprocity. Built on what he termed ‘diffuse reciprocity’ in the form of the general 
MFN rule as discussed below, this hybrid incorporated the ‘primary supplier rule’ to 
prevent any ‘free-riding’ which might be facilitated by the non-discrimination norm. 
The ‘primary supplier rule’ required all states supplying more than a negotiated 
percentage of a specific product to furnish compensation in the event that one 
made concessions;70 in this way only very small suppliers could ‘free-ride’.  The 
reciprocity rule is also deemed to be politically necessary for politicians to be able 
to make concessions palatable in domestic politics.71 Whilst liberalisation of trade 
may bring benefits to the domestic economy as a whole, certain industries may be 
disadvantaged by the changes wrought and thus bring political pressure to bear on 
decision makers not to go the liberalisation route. Reciprocal liberalisation 
counterbalances these pressures in that it allows politicians to make promises of 
visible export gains to other industries.72 
Rules: Most Favoured Nation and National Treatment 
The rules which govern the GATT include the concepts of Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) and National Treatment. The MFN rule puts the non-discrimination norm 
into practice in that it dictates that in the normal course of trade countries may not 
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discriminate between or favour any trading partners over any others73 and any 
privileges extended to one state must be extended to all. This rule is enshrined in 
Article I(1) of the GATT 194774 and guarantees that like products of one state with 
MFN status should receive the same trading treatment as another state with MFN 
status; under the GATT all members have MFN status. The term is somewhat 
misleading as under GATT all member states are technically ‘most favoured’, but it 
is derived from the historical use of the concept in bi-lateral trade instruments to 
discriminate against other non-signatory states. The reciprocity norm is also built 
into the MFN rule as delineated above: any favourable terms conferred on a state 
create a reciprocal compensatory obligation.75 
These two norms also underpin the rule of national treatment expressed in 
GATT Article III.76 This rule dictates that products from a foreign country must be 
treated (subject to regulations or taxes) no differently to domestically produced like 
products.77 It is this emphasis on ‘like-products’ that is the crux of the problem in 
the case studies as this paper will show. 
There are of course, some exceptions to both norms, but these are few and 
have been explicitly outlined. Until the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
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(SPS) Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreements were concluded 
during the Uruguay Round of the GATT, the only exceptions to the founding 
principles of the GATT were the narrowly delineated Article XX exceptions. This 
meant that only in very specific instances - and these also subject to the overriding 
conditions of the article’s chapeau - could states impose regulatory measures on 
imported goods without violating the non-discrimination and reciprocity norms of 
the regime.  
Fundamentally, the two disputes analysed in this paper arose from a departure 
from the non-discrimination and national treatment rules by the US (the defendant 
in both cases); departures which the US posited were permissible under 2 clauses of 
the General Exceptions (Article XX). Whilst these exceptions could be interpreted to 
allow protection or regulatory measures to be taken pursuant to environmental 
protection, they don’t explicitly mention the environment. 
Decision making process: all say ‘aye’… 
The design of both the consultation process and dispute-resolution mechanisms 
has important implications in terms of whether and which problems are (or are not) 
escalated or resolved in a timely and effective manner.78 Although technically under 
GATT each contracting party had one vote, in practice the real bargaining took place 
in so-called ‘green-room’ meetings convened, by invitation only, between principle 
suppliers and consumers (logically the larger states). Decisions were reached 
through the consensus of parties present and then extended as fait accompli to the 
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other GATT contracting parties79 - large delegations from large states therefore 
wielded more de facto votes than the one-contracting-party-one-vote system would 
imply. 
So much for cooperation… why then do trade disputes arise? 
Having a clearer picture of why states cooperate, this paper will now focus on 
why disputes arise between trading partners in a regime. In the most generic terms 
disputes arise when one state takes action which erodes the gains another state 
accrues from being part of the regime,80 thus raising the latter’s costs of, or 
impeding the flow of benefits from, participating in the regime.  
Disputes also arise from competing claims for the importance of national 
interests and sometimes from interest groups within a state, because even though 
states act as unitary actors - in as much as they might have a single ‘trade policy’ – 
they are subject to competing interest groups domestically. The increasing 
interdependence of states has meant that the delineation between domestic and 
international politics is increasingly blurred: domestic issues spill over into 
international politics and a states’ foreign policy is frequently informed by, and has 
an influence on, the domestic arena. The influence of domestic law and civil society 
on government trade policy is very clear in both disputes as the US government was 
forced into taking action against a trade partner by the actions of domestic interest 
groups and its own laws. Thus governments continuously negotiate a fine line 
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between accruing the benefits of belonging to a regime and ensuring the costs of 
compliance don’t fall too heavily on domestically important groups.81 
Dispute resolution under GATT  
GATT’s early status as a limited trade agreement was reflected in the ad-hoc 
nature of the original diplomatic system of dispute resolution; this evolved over 
time into a non-binding rule-orientated arbitration scheme.82 In the early years of 
the GATT the ‘contracting parties’ (all signatory states) either handled disputes 
jointly or set up ad-hoc groups of diplomatic representatives to investigate 
complaints. From 1995 the GATT Secretariat established independent panels of 
three to five experts to arbitrate disputes. Although this meant the dispute 
resolution mechanism gradually became more legalistic it was still formally non-
binding, lacking a formal legal personality and the authority to authorise collective 
action against individual states.83  
In GATT parlance potential disputes would arise whenever a state claimed 
another had acted in such a manner as to have caused the "nullification and 
impairment" of benefits accrued under the Treaty. Article 23 of the GATT then 
authorised the aggrieved state to suspend its GATT obligations to the infringing 
state until such time as the situation had been rectified or a GATT panel had made 
some recommendation. The consensual dispute resolution mechanism of the GATT, 
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however, allowed the losing party in a dispute to block the adoption of the dispute 
panel’s findings thereby avoiding being subject to compensatory trade measures.84 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO 
Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement is the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). This agreement establishes 
the procedures with which trade disputes between members are handled by the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
The DSU is considered by many analysts to be the major achievement of the 
Uruguay Round.85 Over 300 disputes were brought to the WTO in the period 
between its inception in 1995 and 2006.86 The function of the initial panel – which is 
judicial in nature – is to make recommendations in an interim report to the DSB;87 
‘negative consensus’ prevails in that the findings of the panel are automatically 
adopted by the DSB unless a party to the dispute objects within a 60 day period of 
the circulation of the report to WTO members or the DSB decides by consensus not 
to adopt the panel’s findings.88 If a party to the dispute appeals the panel report is 
not adopted until the appeal is heard. Findings of the Appellate Body are also 
adopted by negative consensus within 30 days of the circulation of the Appellate 
Body report.89 This means that in contrast to the uncertainty of the more ad-hoc 
GATT procedures through which a finding could eventually be effectively vetoed by 
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the ‘defendant’ state, the WTO’s DSU facilitates a regularised and largely automatic 
dispute resolution mechanism which brings a crucial element of certainty to the 
trading regime. 
Conclusion 
In this paper GATT is understood to be a regime because it conforms to the four 
characteristics of Krasner’s definition, namely it has principles, norms, rules, and 
decision making practices; all of which have been elaborated upon above. The WTO 
has elements which conform to the definition which is not unexpected given that it 
is underpinned by the GATT in its 1994 form. In addition, however, the WTO is an 
international organization with a structured legal ‘personality’, bureaucracy and a 
formalised dispute resolution mechanism.  
The next chapter is a case study analysis of the two so-called Tuna-Dolphin 
disputes - the first between Mexico and the US and the second between the EEC 
(and the Netherlands) and the US - and highlights the application of the preceding 
discussion to the question of the nature of the treatment of Article XX exception 
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Chapter 3: The GATT dispute - DS21/R (Tuna-Dolphin) 
This chapter will analyse the Tuna-Dolphin cases to 
ascertain how marine-based Art. XX exception disputes 
were dealt with under the GATT trading regime. In order to 
do so this chapter will firstly look at how the dispute arose, 
the disputants and the significance thereof (if any) and 
each disputant’s specific claims. The discussion of the GATT 
adjudication panels’ rulings will include a brief description 
of the dispute resolution mechanism. This paper will 
comment briefly on how the rulings have been interpreted 
by academic writers and civil society and then examine whether or how the ruling 
has impacted upon GATT jurisprudence in the final chapter. As the analysis 
proceeds the insights from regime theory will be applied.  
Background 
In essence the Tuna-Dolphin case is about the intersection of the environmental 
problem of “bycatch” and the politically problematic exercise of unilateralism within 
the regime. Bycatch is the rather innocuous term for the many unintended and 
commercially unviable marine animals caught though unselective fishing methods – 
like using purse seine nets - in addition to the targeted, commercially viable fish. It 
is of particular environmental concern as it has a marked effect on the marine 
ecosystem, is unregulated and does not count towards landing quotas enforced to 
Disputants 
Complainant: Mexico 
Respondent: United States  
Timeline of Dispute 
Panel requested:  
25 January 1991. 
Panel established:  
6 February 1991. 
Panel composed:  
12 March 1991. 
Panel Report circulated: 3 
September 1991. 
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protect fisheries.1 In the Tuna-Dolphin cases up to 5 species of dolphin are the 
bycatch of Tuna harvesting because in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) Ocean, 
herds of dolphins swim above schools of tuna; a characteristic which is unique to 
this ocean. This has been exploited by fishermen for decades as an indicator of tuna 
schools swimming underneath the surface which can then be encircled with nets up 
to 1 mile/1.7km long and several hundred feet/meters deep.2 
Dolphins (as air-breathing mammals) are particularly vulnerable to the use of 
purse-seine net method of tuna harvesting as they drown when the net is drawn 
together through the pursing rings at the bottom and dragged under water in the 
process of  being hauled onto the boat (called a purse seiner).3 They may also be 
killed in the winching mechanism, or injured trying to escape entanglement leaving 
them weakened and vulnerable to subsequent predators.4 In the 1970s it has been 
estimated that approximately 400 000 dolphins were killed annually5 which incited 
public opinion and prompted action by the United States Congress in the form of 
the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) promulgated in 1972. The MMPA was 
amended twice in the 1980s in response to the fishing industry’s attempts to evade 
the new regulations - for instance, many US ships simply re-flagged in order to avoid 
the MMPA restrictions until the amendment requiring foreign fleets to have 
comparable legislation to that of the USA’s was enacted.6 
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The Marine Mammal Protection Act’s initial goal (it was made less stringent in 
later amendments due to pressure from the US tuna industry) was to reduce, as 
close to zero as possible, death or injury to marine mammals arising from fishing. 
Furthermore it mandated that there would be a moratorium on the incidental 
‘taking’7 of marine mammals subject to exceptions for which permits would be 
required.8 The MMPA was hailed as a foundation of US environmental protection 
legislation and specifically employed trade measures to promote conservation as a 
legislative approach.9 
How did the dispute arise? 
In 1990 a San Francisco-based environment group, the Earth Island Institute, 
filed suit against the US Government because it sought to have the import ban 
provisions of the MMPA upheld. Eventually the US Government was ordered by the 
Federal Court to uphold the provisions of the MMPA by implementing the 
mandatory ban on imported tuna from countries which would/could not certify that 
they had a dolphin-kill ratio comparably low to that of the US fishing fleets.10 In 
response to the Federal Court ruling the USA unilaterally imposed embargoes 
(trade-restrictive measures) on several trading partners, including Mexico, which 
harvested yellowfin tuna using purse seine nets and whose commercial fishermen 
had a dolphin kill ratio more than 1.25% higher than that of US fishermen.11   
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In response to the embargo and the prospect of losing as large market as that of 
the USA, Panama and Equador successfully managed to lower their fleets’ dolphin-
kill ratio by banning the setting of purse seine nets on herds of dolphins. Mexico, 
Venezuela and Vanuatu did not agree to comply with US standards and the 
embargo of their products continued.12 In accordance with GATT dispute resolution 
procedures Mexico requested the required 60 days of consultations with the USA, 
and when these weren’t successful in getting the USA to lift the embargo, 
requested in February 1991 that an adjudication panel be convened according to 
the dispute resolution procedures of GATT.13 The Panel report ruling on the dispute 
is formally referred to as, “United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna 
(DS21/R)”, but it is commonly known as the Tuna-Dolphin I dispute. 
The US also unilaterally applied secondary embargoes on ‘intermediary’ states 
which failed to show within 90 days that they’d taken action to prevent importation 
of tuna harvested using purse seine nets.14 These secondary embargoes would form 
the basis of the Tuna-Dolphin II dispute and will be discussed below. There were no 
similar embargoes on US produced yellowfin tuna; rather the US regulated the 
catching of marine mammals incidental to harvesting tuna in their territorial 
waters15 by implementing the MMPA regulations.  
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Dispute resolution mechanism 
The main dispute settlement provisions are found in Article XXII – consultation 
and conciliation procedures – and Article XXIII – which governs formal investigations 
and rulings. Any contracting party contending that its rights or benefits under the 
regime had been infringed or compromised had the right to approach the allegedly 
‘offending’ party and to expect that party to apply due consideration to their 
request for consultations in order to rectify the matter.16  This is the reciprocity 
norm in action and at this point it is applied in the attempt to contain disputes.17 
Should these consultations fail, however, after 60 days the aggrieved contracting 
party could approach the CONTRACTING PARTIES  to request an investigation and 
ruling into the ‘nullification and impairment’ of their rights.18 In practice the 
aggrieved contracting party referred the complaint to the General Council of the 
GATT and it assigned 3 people to a panel to adjudicate the matter. The ruling was 
not binding until the CONTRACTING PARTIES adopted it by consensus. This meant 
that the ‘defendant’ had to adopt it too; and it meant they could potentially block 
the report.19  The reciprocity norm is evident in the dispute settlement process as 
the main purpose is to restore and thus ultimately maintain, the beneficial terms of 
trade and advantages accruing from regime membership.20 Were the matter 
deemed serious enough though, the aggrieved party may have been permitted to 
block the ‘offending’ party from accruing benefits from the regime, whereupon the 
latter party may have chosen to exercise its right to opt out of the GATT 
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altogether.21  This step was authorised in only one dispute in the regime’s 47 years 
as it represents a failure of multilateralism and the norms of non-discrimination and 
reciprocity and as such was to be applied only as a last resort.  
Significance of the disputants and their specific claims 
The disputants in the primary embargo case were the US and Mexico. The sight 
of a developing world supplier taking on a developed world giant in the forum 
offered by GATT was not a common one as developing countries were less likely to 
participate in the GATT dispute resolution process for a variety of reasons still 
debated amongst academics.22 One suggestion however, is that disputants could 
employ delaying tactics and so increase the costs of the action: costs which 
developing countries often couldn’t afford even if the country stood a good chance 
of winning.23  
The US was one of the most likely candidates to attempt a unilateral action in 
the name of the environment. Firstly, it was a significant market for many of its 
suppliers which gave it significant leverage – in Game Theory parlance it had ‘go-it-
alone’ power. Secondly, the US had pioneering environmental protection laws (up 
to the eviscerating tenures of Reagan and the Bushes) as well as some of the most 
vocal, well organised and well funded environmental groups in the world.  
Mexico’s general claims were that the US had undermined its gains from 
belonging to the trading regime by imposing import embargoes on its tuna exports; 
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and that the comparison (of dolphin-kill ratios) method imposed by the MMPA 
protected the US fleet rather than the dolphins as it claimed.24 More specifically 
Mexico claimed that certain provisions of the MMPA had contravened the GATT 
Article XI general provision on the prohibition of quantitative restrictions (a non-
tariff barrier) and set up geographically defined discriminatory conditions in 
contravention of Article XIII – the article governing non-discriminatory 
administration of quantitative restrictions.25  
Furthermore Mexico claimed that even should these issues be corrected and the 
embargo lifted, after importation their tuna products would be further 
discriminated against in the MMPA’s application of comparison between US and 
Mexican yellowfin tuna harvesting regulations: this would be an infringement of 
Mexico’s rights under the rule of national treatment found in GATT Article III.26 This 
rule dictates that products from a foreign country must be treated no differently to 
domestically produced like products27 and is informed by the norms of reciprocity 
and non-discrimination within the trading regime. In response the USA posited that 
the embargo was not a quantitative restriction of the kind banned by Article XI, but 
that the MMPA constituted nothing more that an internal regulation applied to 
external imports in the manner prescribed by Article III(4) in accordance with the 
regime’s rule of National Treatment.28 
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Furthermore, the USA contended that even if the measures were not found to 
be in accordance with Article III, they would be permissible under the general 
exceptions of Article XX.29 Mexico in turn took issue with what it interpreted as the 
unilateral application of measures (by the US) which would have had the effect of 
subordinating its legislative capacity to that of the US. It stated that the Article XX 
exceptions would necessarily have to be interpreted as being applicable only to 
measures taken within a contracting party’s own jurisdiction in order to avoid 
introducing the concept of extraterritoriality into the GATT.30 Extraterritoriality is a 
highly problematic concept in any regime based on the acceptance of other regime 
members’ sovereignty and is also against international law.31  In addition Mexico 
averred that the sections of the MMPA providing for the intermediary embargo 
against secondary contracting parties which imported Mexican tuna constituted 
unilateral interference in the trade between other countries32 - the US had 
arrogated a supervisory role vis-à-vis the tuna trade between other contracting 
parties. 
Ten other countries (Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Norway, 
Philippines, Senegal, Thailand, Venezuela) and the European Economic Community 
(EEC) also submitted briefs to the panel criticising a variety of the MMPA’s sections 
and thus were considered contracting parties to the dispute.33  
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Panel Ruling in Tuna-Dolphin 1 
The GATT adjudication panel Mexico had requested under the dispute 
resolution procedure of the GATT reported in September 1991. The panel asserted 
that it had ruled on the application of GATT rules to the issue and not on the 
environmental merits of the actions.34 In the interest of a broader understanding of 
the Panel decision, the following few paragraphs will briefly examine the findings in 
relation to  Article III and Article XI before examining the rulings viz. Article XX in 
more depth. 
The Embargo: quantitative restriction or application of internal regulation?  
The USA stated that the restrictions placed on Mexican tuna constituted the 
application of a domestic regulation in accordance with the MMPA’s regulations 
and as such were consistent with Article III(4) and in accordance with the National 
Treatment rule of the trading regime.35  
The adjudication Panel, however, disagreed and found that the US had based 
the embargo on the process used to harvest the tuna and according to the Panel’s 
reading of Article III, it “covers only those measures that are applied to the product 
as such” .36 Since the MMPA regulated the actual method of harvesting in order to 
reduce dolphin kills these regulations were not considered to be applied to the sale 
of or the end product itself and therefore did not constitute internal regulations of 
the type covered by Article III as averred by the US.37 Thus the Panel ruled that the 
US should lift its embargo of imported tuna as Article III(4) called for the 
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“comparison of the treatment of imported tuna as a product with that of domestic 
tuna as a product” and thus the comparison of the dolphin-kill ratios of Mexican 
and US fleets were irrelevant to the tuna trade38 irrespective of the environmental 
harm caused.  
With this statement the GATT ruling laid all process-based environmental trade 
measures open to challenge as GATT inconsistent.39 This is a prime example of the 
contentious ‘product’ versus ‘process’ issue at the heart of the antagonism between 
free trade proponents and environmentalists.   
Having found that the embargoes could not be justified as internal regulations 
under Article III(4), the Panel was obliged to find that the embargoes constituted 
quantitative restrictions in violation of Mexico’s rights under the trading regime 
(Article XI).40 In addition, the application of the US dolphin kill ratio as a standard 
was deemed unfair as it was determined retroactively and therefore uncertainty 
prevailed for Mexican fishermen until after they had brought in their harvests.41 
The Article XX exceptions  
Taken at face-value, the actions taken by the USA pursuant to the MMPA’s 
regulations with the purpose of preserving dolphins from extinction would certainly 
appear to qualify under the Article XX exceptions to the general rules of the trading 
regime. The panel, however, rejected the US claim that the embargo was justifiable 
under the exceptions of Article XX(b) - to protect human or animal health – and 
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Article XX(g) - to protect exhaustible natural resources. It adopted a very strict 
reading of the Article XX exceptions to the general GATT rules and stressed that the 
burden of proof lay on the party claiming the exception.42 
The Panel founded its rejection of the use of Art. XX(b) on three broad points. 
Namely that the embargo sought to protect ‘resources’ not within the jurisdiction of 
the US; the GATT regime would be undermined by a broader interpretation of the 
exceptions and what it interpreted as the lack of necessity of the embargo to lower 
dolphin mortality rates. 
Extra-jurisdictionality 
In essence the Panel adopted Mexico’s position that the protection of this 
exception could not be sought for measures applied outside the jurisdiction of the 
USA. To reach this conclusion the panel took the unusual approach of looking at the 
drafting history of the clause in order to a gain clarity on the issue of jurisdiction as 
this wasn’t clear in the wording of Art. XX(b).43 By doing so they came to the 
conclusion that because the phrase ‘if corresponding safeguards under similar 
conditions exist in the importing country’ was not included at the end of Article 
XX(b) as was proposed during GATT negotiations, this omission indicated that the 
drafters had intended the exception to be applicable to protect the life or health of 
humans, animals and plants only within the jurisdiction of the country claiming the 
exception.44 
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A broader interpretation would undermine the international trade regime 
The Panel ruled that the broader interpretation of Article XX(b) forwarded by 
the US would jeopardise the multilateral nature of the trading regime by giving all 
contracting parties the unilateral right to set life or health protection policies from 
which others could not deviate for fear of losing their rights or benefits under the 
GATT.45 This in turn would limit the application of the regime’s norms of non-
discrimination and reciprocity to only those contracting parties with identical 
domestic health and life policy regulations46 and in so doing undermine the 
multilateral nature of the regime. 
Necessity 
Whilst affirming that each contracting party to the GATT had the right of a 
sovereign country to legislate its own human, animal or plant health policy, the 
Panel stated that there were still limitations on the application of Article XX 
exceptions in relation to the trade measures used. The trade measures for which 
the exceptions were being claimed must be “necessary” and may not “constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade”.47 In other words, the exceptions could not be used as a cover 
to implement protective measures which would ordinarily be against the ethos of 
unrestricted trade. 
The Panel ruled that the MMPA did not qualify for protection under the 
exceptions because it was not ‘necessary’; there were, the Panel concluded, other 
multilateral measures, less GATT inconsistent, that the USA could have pursued in 
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order to achieve dolphin conservation.48 In this regard the Panel referred to the 
Panel decision in the Thai-Cigarettes dispute in 1990 in which it was ruled that the 
exceptions could be used to waiver the usual trading regime rights of other 
contracting parties only to the extent that the use thereof was unavoidable.49  
Another problem with the MMPA arose from the mechanics of setting the 
dolphin kill-ratio. The US legislation required imported tuna to have been harvested 
with a kill-ratio of not more than 25% that of the US tuna fleet: accordingly a foreign 
fleet fishing in the ETP would not know whether their ratio was under that of the US 
fleet’s until after it had harvested tuna. Thus, for foreign fleets uncertainty 
prevailed and the Panel ruled that any trade measures based thereon could not 
meet the necessity test.50 
The concern with extra-jurisdictionality also underpinned the Panel’s rejection 
of the use of Article XX(g). It found that in applying the embargo, the US was guilty 
of ‘extra-jurisdictionality’ because it had effectively attempted to enforce its 
domestic laws on another country51 when instead the jurisdiction of the US should 
delimit efforts to control production and consumption of exhaustible resources.52 
Again, its concern with this issue stemmed from the potential thereof to undermine 
the gains from having a consistent set of rules (as opposed to multiple competing 
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domestic rules) across the GATT regime.53 On the question of whether or not 
dolphins could be considered exhaustible natural resources the Panel was silent 
even though Mexico and the US had each presented arguments.54 The Panel was 
critical of the retroactive dolphin-kill ratio aspect of the MMPA because this made 
trading for Mexico an unpredictable affair: that unpredictability proved, it 
concluded, that the trade measure was not enforced primarily to conserve dolphins 
as was required by Article XX(g)55 but as a form of protectionism. 
As was usual practice when GATT dispute panels were convened, they were held 
in private, members of the public and NGOs were not permitted into the sessions, 
nor was the information on which the Panel made its decision made available. 
However, such was the public furore that the decision was made public before it 
was adopted by the GATT Council.56 This last fact, besides being highly unusual, may 
have contributed to the eventual non-adoption of this ruling: at the time Mexico 
was also in negotiations with the USA about a possible North American free trade 
zone and may have feared the negative publicity and tarnishing of its international 
image that pushing for the adoption of the ruling may have entailed. After the 
North American free trade zone talks, the USA, Mexico and Venezuela came to an 
agreement in March 1992 to reduce the killing of dolphins and the MMPA 
embargoes were rendered redundant.57 The civil society and public outcry, 
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however, was a salient reminder that GATT rules and the trading regime did not 
exist in a vacuum. 
Reaction to the Tuna-Dolphin I ruling 
In practise this ruling has the potential to favour products whose environmental 
costs have been externalised as these are almost always economically (not socially 
or environmentally) cheaper: products produced in an environmentally sustainable 
manner are thus undermined58. In a ruling which has been variously called a 
“strained reading”,59 “poorly reasoned”,60 and more politely, “sweeping”,61 civil 
society and academics focussed their criticism almost entirely on the Panel’s 
rejection of the use of the Article XX exceptions and ‘artificial’ distinction between 
product and process and hence this case has become synonymous with any pro-
environment criticism of the trading regime.  
The Panel’s reading of Article III to include only regulations which apply to actual 
end products has been criticised as being far too narrow a reading of the text. 
Article III(4) stipulates that all internal laws, regulations and requirements which are 
applied to the sale of internal products should also be applied to imported products 
(national treatment rule); thus since the MMPA regulates the sale of internally 
harvested tuna, the same regulations should be applied to imported/externally 
harvested tuna62. Critics of the ruling have pointed out that without the ability to 
enact bans on products produced in environmentally unsustainable processes 
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countries are effectively unable to protect their local environments or encourage 
environmentally sustainable production methods.63 In addition since under the 
MMPA US fishermen must meet more stringent standards than importers they are 
at a competitive disadvantage – a fact which made the MMPA extremely unpopular 
within the US tuna industry64 - but which underscores the USA’s point that the 
regulations meet the conditions of the National Treatment rule in Article III. 
Criticisms of Panel’s rejection of the applicability of Article XX exceptions 
Many lawyers and academics have criticised the drafting history approach used 
by the Panel to gain clarity on the meaning of Article XX(b) because it represented a 
marked departure from the emphatically textualist approach it had adopted 
throughout the report,65 and because such an approach is not well-established in 
public international law. 66 Where ambiguity exists in international treaties, the 
correct approach is to interpret the ambiguous clause in accordance with outlines in 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT);67 the Panel 
should have interpreted Article XX(b) in light of ‘the context, the object and 
purpose, any instrument relating to the treaty and any subsequent agreement or 
practice of the parties and any relevant rules of international law’.68 Article 32 
should be resorted to only under strictly specified conditions. In the Tuna-Dolphin I 
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case the panel resorted to Article 32 in their quest for clarity without exhausting the 
outlines of Article 31 first.  
The Panel’s interpretation regarding the dropping of the phrase ‘if 
corresponding safeguards under similar conditions exist in the importing country’ 
form Article XX(b) has confounded some writers who point out that the simplest 
explanation for this is that the drafters thought it confusing and redundant when 
the clause is read in conjunction with the Article XX chapeau.69 Furthermore, the 
Panel’s strict reading of the clause renders it largely redundant by circumscribing 
the issue of jurisdiction because any measures instituted domestically to protect 
health and life would already be justified under Article III providing the National 
Treatment rule requirements were also met.70 The Panel’s conclusion that the 
drafting history of Article XX(b) indicated that this exception was only applicable to 
a party’s own jurisdiction rendered the Article XX exceptions virtually meaningless 
especially when they may be applied to the global commons.71 Even given the 
drafting history approach applied, critics do not believe the Panel convincingly 
demonstrated that the intention of the original drafters – as contained in the cited 
Article 32 of the Draft Charter of the international Trade Organisation – excluded 
adoption of measures outside a country’s jurisdiction.72 In addition, even if the 
argument (that such a restrictive jurisdictional meaning was to be inferred from the 
deleted line) was accepted, the fact that the line was dropped should surely have 
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meant that the drafters did not intend such a restricted jurisdiction. The logical flaw 
in the Panel’s decision meant they interpreted exactly the opposite.73   
Environmentalists have also criticised the Panel’s apparent lack of knowledge of 
the USA’s attempts at multilateral dolphin conservation and have pointed out that 
far from turning to the Article XX exceptions as a first resort in the attempts to 
protect the dolphin populations of the ETP, the USA had attempted other 
multilateral approaches, like negotiations on multilateral conservation measures 
with other countries with tuna fleets in the ETP for a number of years, without 
success,74 before the MMPA forced embargoes. In essence, the Panel erected an 
incredibly high barrier to environmental measures because it interpreted 
‘necessary’ as ‘least GATT inconsistent’. This ‘least-trade-restrictive’ approach did 
not appear to take into account that other approaches to addressing an 
environmental issue might be either complicated, time-consuming (and in the case 
of exhaustible natural resources the timeframe is critical), or politically impossible 
to implement.75 
The Panel report was seen as firmly biased in favour of free trade in asserting 
that domestic environmental protection regimes may not interfere with 
international trade. This surprised many as it marked a departure from the slightly 
more accommodating stance of previous panels considering the broader trade-
environment nexus.76 
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Impact on GATT jurisprudence & consequences for the regime 
The Panel’s report was not officially adopted by the GATT Council because 
Mexico did not pursue the matter and entered into bilateral discussions with the 
USA instead. As such it does not form part of GATT legal precedence, however, as 
an indication of the prioritisation of trade over environment concerns in future it 
has provoked much debate,77 controversy between environmentalists and free 
trade advocates and a plethora of articles in both the popular press78 and academic 
journals.79 The Panel’s decision also impacted negatively upon the GATT’s public 
image with a popular cartoon at the time depicting the GATT as a Godzilla-figure 
trampling all in its path.80 What had been a relatively arcane speciality –the GATT 
Working Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade, for instance, 
was established in 1971 and failed to meet for the next 20 years - suddenly took 
centre stage.81 
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Tuna-Dolphin II 
In order to prevent tuna importers from 
circumventing the MMPA’s provisions by simply shipping 
tuna products which would otherwise be embargoed via 
other non-embargoed countries, the US Congress had 
enacted an ‘intermediary nations’ embargo; to prevent 
an importer from doing indirectly what it couldn’t do 
directly.82 
Disputants and specific claims 
The European Economic Community (EEC) was at the forefront of efforts to get 
the GATT Council to adopt the Tuna-Dolphin I panel report as it suspected the USA 
and Mexico of collusion to prevent the adoption thereof. In this they were 
unsuccessful. By 1994, however, the EEC83 and the Netherlands, representing some 
of the countries affected by the USA’s ‘intermediary nations’ embargoes 
successfully applied for the convening of an adjudication panel under GATT Article 
XXIII(2) to address the matter of the secondary embargo.84 This dispute is 
commonly termed ‘Tuna-Dolphin II’85 and the Panel report thereof was circulated 
on 16 June 1994.86 This raised similar issues regarding the right of one state to 
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Disputants 
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Timeline of Dispute 
Panel requested:  
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unilaterally impose restrictions on others in pursuit of domestic environmental 
regulations.  
Article XI and Article III 
The EEC and Netherlands took the same stance on the intermediary embargo as 
Mexico had on the primary one: the embargo was a quantitative restriction 
explicitly prohibited by Article XI of the GATT and not an internal regulation 
permissible under Article III87. The US did not dispute the EEC argument vis-à-vis 
Article XI or Article III and proposed that the burden of proof in that regard lay with 
the EEC.88  
The Article XX exceptions 
In the matter of the intermediary nations embargo, the US claimed that its 
measures were permissible under general exceptions of Article XX (b), (d) and (g).89 
In refuting this claim the EEC and Netherlands averred that the location was a key 
factor and thus the US measures which applied to living things to be protected or a 
natural resource to be preserved outside of the jurisdiction of the US, were not 
covered by the Article XX exceptions they claimed.90 The US in turn argued that 
location was irrelevant to the interpretation of Article XX (b) and (g) .91 In order to 
support its claim that the intermediary embargo met the stated requirements of 
Article XX(g), the US pointed out that not only were dolphins an exhaustible natural 
resource,92 but that there were stringent restrictions on domestic supply and 
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consumption in place as required.93 Furthermore the US claimed that the 
intermediary nations embargo was within the ambit of Article XX(d) – “necessary to 
secure compliance with laws or regulations” - because it was a measure necessary 
to ensure compliance with the primary embargo. 
Panel Ruling in Tuna-Dolphin II 
This Panel placed the emphasis on extraterritoriality and not extra-
jurisdictionality94 as had Tuna-Dolphin I report. It was on the point of unilateral 
application of measures that the panel found the actions of the USA to be GATT 
inconsistent. Furthermore the application of trade measures based on the process 
and not the product was also found to be GATT inconsistent.95 
From the formulation of Article XX this panel deduced a three step process for 
interpreting Article XX (b) and (g). First, the Panel would determine whether the 
policy in question (the MMPA) was in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 
(b) and (g). Secondly, the panel would assess whether the measure for which the 
exception was being invoked was “necessary” in the case of Article XX(b)96 or 
“related to” the conservation of exhaustible natural resources and applied “in 
conjunction” with restrictions on domestic production and consumption.97 Lastly it 
would assess whether the measures which had been taken were in the spirit of the 
chapeau of Article XX which required that measures “not *be+ applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
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countries where the same conditions prevail or in a manner which would constitute 
a disguised restriction on international trade”.98  
The second Tuna-Dolphin Panel concluded unambiguously that living creatures 
could be considered exhaustible natural resources and thus potentially trade 
measures to protect them could be deemed permissible under the Article XX(g) 
exception.99 Furthermore, it could find no reason to support the first panel’s 
insistence on domestic jurisdiction as the text of article does not contain reference 
to location.100 In a ruling which criticised the first Tuna-Dolphin Panel’s skewed use 
of the drafting history and improper application of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties,101 this Panel found that the US policy to 
conserve the ETP dolphins fell within the type of policies covered by the Article 
XX(g) exceptions providing these were applied extraterritorially only against their 
own nationals and vessels.102 
Civil Society and academic reaction to Tuna-Dolphin II 
Critics have pointed to the sweeping nature of the rulings against the 
environmental protection measures implemented in both cases as leaving little 
scope for future GATT-legal trade measures to protect environmental resources.103 
Writers like Andersson, Folke and Nyström, however, posited that this Panel’s 
interpretation of use of the Article XX exceptions represented a significant step in 
GATT jurisprudence in relation to the trade and environment nexus. In particular 
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they point to paragraph 5.20 as “open*ing+ up for discussion” the question of when 
Article XX(g) exceptions may be used to legitimize extra-territorial trade measures 
used to preserve exhaustible natural resources.104 Academic commentators like 
Schoenbaum and Cheyne assert that the Tuna-Dolphin II decision clearly and 
correctly makes the distinction between extrajurisdictionality and extraterritoriality. 
According to customary international law, states have an obligation to prevent 
damage to the environment of other states and the environment beyond any 
national jurisdiction (like the deep oceans), thus the exceptions of Article XX (b) and 
(g) could be interpreted as allowing national measures designed to protect 
extraterritorial resources, providing such extraterritorial jurisdiction is exercised 
within the scope and limitations of international law. In other words, the Tuna-
Dolphin II Panel ruling that Article XX has extraterritorial, but not extrajurisdictional 
effect105 has good grounding in international law. 
Mattoo and Mavroidis (members of the WTO secretariat writing in their own 
capacity), whilst agreeing that the second Panel report’s use of extraterritoriality is 
less confusing than the first Panel’s use of extrajurisdictionality, state that 
nonetheless the second Panel did not address the important issue of whether 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the USA was legitimate.106 
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Impact on GATT jurisprudence & consequences for the regime 
Even though the Panel found in favour of the EEC and Netherlands, the grounds 
on which it did so were not as restrictive as the first Panel’s reasoning. Firstly, ruling 
that living creatures could be considered exhaustible natural resources ensured that 
Article XX(g) could potentially provide cover for future conservation measures to be 
taken. This was an unambiguous statement, quite unlike the Tuna-Dolphin I Panel 
which avoided the issue by focussing on the issue of jurisdiction instead.  
Secondly, the Panel ruled that Article XX(g) was not necessarily limited to 
measures undertaken in the domestic jurisdiction. In leaving open the question of 
the extra-juridical application of environmental protection measures, however, it 
might have proved problematic for the trade-liberalisation camp in the future had it 
been accepted and become part of GATT jurisprudence.  
This report wasn’t accepted by consensus by the CONTRACTING PARTIES before 
the GATT made way for the WTO in 1995. As such it did not formally enter into the 
GATT jurisprudence that was absorbed into the WTO. 
Conclusion 
The GATT treatment of the two Article XX disputes differs somewhat even 
though the issues at stake were very similar: discrimination and unilateralism. The 
1991 Tuna-Dolphin I ruling was extremely contentious, raised the profile of the 
‘trade and environment’ debate significantly within academia and the general 
populace and seemingly raised the ire of almost every environmentalist in the USA. 
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US to be acting unilaterally and beyond its jurisdiction in applying the embargo to 
tuna harvested using Purse-Seine nets in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. 
Circumscribing the jurisdiction of the environmental exceptions to the domestic 
arena only renders the exceptions unable to deal with problems that may arise at 
the intersection of international trade practices and the global commons; any 
attempts to address these may potentially violate GATT.107 A general concern 
amongst the environmental community, particularly in the US, was that other 
countries would use the GATT and specifically, the Panel ruling, to call into question 
the GATT legitimacy of the existing raft of environmental protection legislation.108 In 
addition, environmentalists contend that sometimes only trade measures get 
results in terms of saving species and the eventual outcome of the Tuna-Dolphin I 
dispute proves their point: having pursued multilateral talks to preserve dolphins in 
the ETP for nearly 20 years, it was this unilateral action by the US which, whilst 
offensive to the GATT, finally produced action on dolphin conservation. When the 
Panel found sections of the MMPA GATT inconsistent, the public outrage helped 
fuel a momentum which led twelve states, including the United States and Mexico, 
to sign the International Agreement for the Reduction of Dolphin Mortality under 
the auspices of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission in 1992.109 This is just 
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one of numerous well documented occasions when unilateral action by a state 
posing a credible ‘threat’ preceded multilateral environmental action.110 
The Panel decision in the Tuna-Dolphin II (1994) dispute was far less contentious 
and legally more coherent, but still did not find the USA’s environmental legislation 
to be GATT consistent. In finding that the Article XX exceptions weren’t 
circumscribed by territory necessarily, it left unanswered the central issue of the 
legitimacy of jurisdictional reach111 in pursuit of environmental objectives.  
Thus the differences between the first and second Tuna-Dolphin panels 
demonstrated that the GATT regime was a relatively flexible ‘contract embodying 
trade rules’112 which was able to evolve over time and as such was able to reflect 
the changing preferences and priorities of the contracting parties.113 This paper will 
now analyse the Shrimp-Turtle disputes (panel and AB) which were adjudicated 
under the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism, the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding. 
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Chapter 4: The WTO dispute  
S58 (Shrimp-Sea Turtle)  
In 1994 the countries participating in the Uruguay Round 
of the GATT negotiations signed the Marrakesh Agreement 
formally establishing the WTO as an international 
organization on the 1st of January 1995. During the Uruguay 
Round the GATT was also reviewed and revised;1 it remains, 
however, the principle multilateral agreement governing the 
trade in goods. Now it is but one of over 60 agreements and 
schedules administered by the WTO.2 Given the new context 
of an international organization – albeit underpinned by the 
GATT regime - this chapter will explore the Shrimp-Sea 
Turtle disputes to establish how marine-based Article XX 
exception disputes were dealt with under the more judicial 
dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO.  
The chapter will examine both the original Panel report and the Appellate Body 
(AB) decision in the following manner. Firstly it will discuss the environmental 
background of the dispute then how the dispute arose, the disputants and the 
significance thereof. The discussion of each disputant’s specific claims will be 
preceded by a brief description of the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO. 
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 GATT 1994 is legally distinguishable from GATT 1947 – see Article II(4) of the ‘Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization’ 
2
 World Trade Organization, The World Trade Organisation: In Brief [online] 
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Disputants 
Complainant: India, Malaysia; 
Pakistan and Thailand. 
Respondent: United States. 
Timeline of Dispute 
Panel requested:  
9 January 1997 (Malaysia and 
Thailand);   
30 January 1997 (Pakistan) and 
25 February 1997 (India). 
Panel established:  
25 February 1997 and 10 April 1997 
(for India). 
Panel composed:  
15 April 1997 (Joint) 
Panel Report circulated:  
15 May 1997. 
Notice of appeal:  
13 July 1998. 
Appellate Body Report circulated:  
12 October 1998. 
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With a better understanding of the mechanism in place the Panel and Appellate 
Body reports will be thoroughly analysed to set up the comparison with the GATT 
case study which will follow in chapter five. A brief commentary on how the rulings 
impacted upon WTO jurisprudence will conclude the analysis in this chapter. 
Throughout the analysis the theory of regimes and organisations will be applied.  
Background 
Sea turtles have extremely large habitat ranges and as such are very difficult to 
protect without the collaborative effort of all the states of the exclusive maritime 
zones through which the turtles move.  The normal migratory pattern of the Olive 
Ridley sea turtle, for instance, is through the territorial waters of 80 states, and they 
nest on the beaches of about 60 states in the tropical areas of the globe.3 Unilateral 
conservation efforts by one state have little effect if other states continue 
unsustainable practices – protection across the turtles’ entire range is necessary.    
There are seven species of marine turtles and all are listed in Appendix 14 of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES).5 This is the highest level of protection offered by the treaty and means they 
are considered to be threatened with extinction and may not be traded except 
where the purpose of the trade is non-commercial (e.g. for scientific research).6  In 
1996 three of the seven - Loggerheads (Caretta caretta), Green Turtles (Chelonia 
mydas)  and Olive Ridleys (Lepidochelys olivacea) - were listed on the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) “Red List of Threatened Species” as 
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 http://www.iucnredlist.org/details/11534 [accessed on 12/02/2009] 
4
 http://www.cites.org/eng/app/E-Jul01.pdf, p.26 [accessed on 12/02/2009] 
5
 In force from 1 July 1975 
6










Chapter 4: The WTO dispute  
Page 73 of 126 
endangered. A further three - Hawksbill Turtle (Eretmochelys imbricata), Kemp's 
Ridley (Lepidochelys kempii) and the Leatherback (Dermochelys coriacea) were 
listed as critically endangered – the last step before a species becomes extinct in the 
wild.7  Only the Flatback (Natator depressus) has not been registered on the Red List 
as insufficient data has been collected to give it a designation. The Flatback sea 
turtle is also the only one of seven species which is not listed in the Appendices of 
the International Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Animals (also known 
as the Bonn Convention).  From this information it is evident that there is significant 
scientific evidence of pressure on sea turtle populations. 
Like the Tuna-Dolphin disputes this dispute pivots on the differing approaches 
to bycatch. Owing to the harvesting method, Shrimp (and prawn) trawling has one 
of the biggest bycatch problems: for every kilogram of prawns harvested, between 
5 and 15 kilograms of assorted other marine-life also dies.8 Bycatch is unregulated 
and does not count towards landing quotas prescribed to protect fisheries. 
Researchers have produced several inventions to reduce the bycatch associated 
with different types of fisheries, but the costs of implementation have meant that 
the Turtle Excluder Device (TED) is one of the only such devices to have been 
commercially implemented. The TED is an angled plastic grid set into the shrimping 
net which guides turtles to a flap in the net through which they can escape.9  
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Extensive shrimp fishing without TEDs has led several species to the brink of 
extinction.10  This is because although sea turtles can, for instance, survive under 
water for several hours whilst sleeping, their ability to do so is affected by 
strenuous activities, such as diving for food, and stress, which is why traumatised 
sea turtles drown in shrimp trawls within a relatively short time-period.11 
Commercial trawlers frequently have trawl-times in excess of the 40 minute safe 
period for turtles in order to be more commercially viable. In the US the 
implementation of TEDs was not a popular step and did not come about as a 
voluntarily on the part of fishermen, but rather as the result of legal regulations 
initiated by political will and backed by international treaties. As will be explored 
below, it is precisely this step – legal enforcement – which became problematic 
when the US tied imports of foreign shrimp to the exporter’s use of TEDs. 
How did the dispute arise? 
Pursuant to its 1973 Endangered Species Act, the United States issued 
regulations in 1990 requiring all domestic shrimp trawlers to install TEDs in their 
nets in an effort to limit sea turtle mortality. In support of these domestic 
regulations,  Public Law 101-162, section 609 has two subsections which attempt to 
induce other nations to use TEDs in their trawlers by embargoing shrimp harvested 
by trawlers without TEDs. This law was enacted in 1989 but the US State 
Department initially only applied it to fourteen Caribbean/Western Atlantic States 
citing concerns over political tensions which would possibly ensue from a globally 
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applied embargo.12 Furthermore these states were given a period of three years in 
which to make their regulations equivalent to those of the US and install TEDs on all 
their trawlers so as to be compliant with the terms of subsection (b) by May 1991 
and secure their access to the large US market.  
The limited application caused much controversy within the USA and eventually 
the Earth Island Institute (an environmental NGO) sued the State Department on 
the grounds that section 609 was intended to be applied globally and not just to 
trawlers of Caribbean states.  In December 1995, in Earth Island Institute v 
Christopher, the US Court of International Trade (CIT) found for the plaintiff and 
decided that the scope of Section 609(b) was clearly intended to be global and not 
geographically circumscribed. It ordered the State Department to apply Section 
609(b) globally by May 1st 1996.13 The State Department complied but provided 
another exception which allowed shrimp harvested by individual trawlers which 
were certified by their host-state as having TEDs even if the host-state did not have 
US-comparable laws. Again, the Earth Island Institute sued the State Department on 
the grounds that the new exception eliminated the need for States to enact TED 
regulations governing their whole fleet and thus the exceptions undermined the 
intent of Section 609(b) by allowing trawlers fishing for other markets to continue 
to harvest in a way detrimental to the sea turtle population.14 Again, in November 
1996, the US Court of International Trade found that the State Department had 
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acted illegally and ordered it to apply Section 609(b) without limitations or 
exceptions. 
In October 1996, even before the final CIT verdict, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and 
Thailand acted jointly in requesting consultations with the USA concerning its 
embargo of a selection of their shrimp exports under Section 609 of U.S. Public Law 
101-162. This they did according to Article XXII(1) of the GATT 1994 and Article 4 of 
the “Understanding On Rules And Procedures Governing The Settlement Of 
Disputes” otherwise referred to as the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) .15  
When these consultations produced no results, these four States16 requested that 
an adjudication Panel be convened to assess the GATT compatibility of US Public 
Law Statue 101-162, section 609(b) which banned imports of shrimps and shrimp 
products from countries which had not been certified as having regulatory 
measures comparable to those of the US to save turtles.17  
The WTO dispute resolution mechanism 
Much like the GATT dispute resolution mechanism, the WTO relies on voluntary 
compliance with its dispute panel rulings as there is no enforcement through 
policing, no possibility of payment of damages for harm inflicted and no threat of 
incarceration.18 However, unlike the GATT, the WTO has a very structured and 
largely automatic process with which to deal with disputes which is delineated in 
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 Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
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Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement - the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). This agreement establishes the 
procedures with which trade disputes between members are handled by the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is the convocation of all members of the 
WTO under another name. Unlike GATT, which has been characterized as having a 
more flexible and political-diplomatic model of dispute resolution, the DSU is a 
legalised model19 with a standing Appellate Body appointed for a four year tenure20 
and a set timeframe within which a dispute must be resolved. For instance Panel 
reports must be adopted by the DSB within 60 days unless there is an appeal;21 any 
appellate review must not exceed 90 days and the whole process from the 
establishment of the panel by the DSB to adoption of its report as WTO ‘law’ must 
take no more than 9 months if a ruling is uncontested or 12 months if a ruling was 
appealed.22  
As mentioned briefly in Chapter two of this paper the DSU differs fundamentally 
from the GATT as the adoption of a Panel/AB report is ‘automatic’ i.e. reports are 
considered adopted by consensus if no member present at the DSB meeting where 
the report is being considered formally objects; this is known as ‘negative 
consensus’.23 Options for a WTO member state when faced with a DSB decision (an 
adopted Panel or AB ruling) not in their favour remain much the same as under 
GATT. The state may comply with the ruling and withdraw the GATT-inconsistent 
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measure, or provide compensation for the ‘nullification and impairment’ of the 
rights of the other party, or resolutely refuse to comply and anticipate retaliation 
from other countries, which usually takes the form of an embargo of the offending 
country’s exports.24 
Significance of the Panel disputants and their specific claims  
Much like the Tuna-Dolphin I case of 1991, this dispute pitted developing states 
against a developed state, however, unlike that case; this case is part of a growing 
trend since the formation of the WTO, in which developing countries are the 
complainants.25 When they do face each other over trade-environment matters the 
different concerns of the parties involved is highlighted. Developing states level the 
criticism that the implementation of highly environmentally demanding regulations 
by developed states is a form of protectionism or even ‘eco-imperialism’. 
Developed states evince concern that developing states’ lower environmental 
regulations give them a competitive advantage and cause a variation of Gresham’s 
law of a ‘race to the bottom’ resulting in less and less environmental protection as 
states try to outdo each other in terms of lack of restrictions.26 Furthermore the 
disputants were all developing states from Asia. Essentially, the four states were 
claiming a derogation of their regime rights because of an infringement of the GATT 
norm of non-discrimination which was incorporated into the WTO as part of the 
single undertaking which created the organization. 
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Complainants’ position: US violation of GATT Articles I(I), XI and XIII(I) 
To provide a comprehensive analysis, this section has been included although it 
doesn’t deal directly with Article XX as per the thesis question. India, Pakistan and 
Thailand combined their claims, but Malaysia forwarded its own claims to the panel. 
The complainants claimed that the US had violated Articles I(1), XI and XIII(1) of the 
GATT. Specifically, India, Pakistan and Thailand claimed that the Section 609(b) 
embargo of their shrimp imports was a violation of their MFN rights as embodied in 
Article I(1) because it treated physically identical end products (shrimp) differently 
based upon how the product was made or produced (harvested).27  
These three states also claimed that the embargo was a de facto quantitative 
import restriction of the type expressly forbidden by Article XI of the GATT.28 In 
addition they claimed that the state-level certification required by Section 609(b) 
facilitated discrimination against the product of individual trawlers which might 
have invested in a TED with which to harvest shrimps.29 Again, contended India, 
Pakistan and Thailand, this constituted differential treatment between ‘like 
products’ based on the process/method of harvesting which is prohibited by Article 
XIII(1) of the GATT. 
Malaysia took issue with the subsection because they considered that the 
intention of the measures was to induce it to change its conservation policies and as 
such was arbitrary, discriminatory and a disguised restriction on international trade 
formulated only to protect the domestic US shrimp industry from foreign 
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competition.30 Furthermore, they claimed that the material facts of the two GATT 
Tuna-Dolphin disputes – whilst not adopted – were similar enough to the facts of 
this case and therefore could be used to support their position that the Panel 
should find Section 609(b) to be an import quota as per Article XI(I).31  
In addition, India, Pakistan, Thailand and Malaysia all took issue with the 
disparity between the phase-in period granted to the Asian and Caribbean states.  
They insisted that they had been further discriminated against because they had 
only been given four months to fit their trawlers with TEDs whereas the original 
fourteen Caribbean states were given a three year grace period before Section 
6089(b) was applied to their exports.32 This would be antithetical to the regime 
norm of non-discrimination and as such in contravention of GATT Article XIII(1), the 
‘Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions’. 
US position: The Article XX exceptions 
The US in turn claimed that the burden of proof was the claimants’ and it didn’t 
provide any arguments to reject the claim that the embargoes constituted 
quantitative restrictions.33 Its main defence was that the actions taken pursuant to 
Section 609(b) were covered by the General Exceptions to the GATT (Article XX), 
particularly subsections (g) and (b).34 These exceptions, the US claimed allowed 
them to take measures that would be ordinarily classified as discriminatory 
(embargo based on the PPM) in order to protect scarce natural resources. The US 
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pointed out that all the complainants had previously agreed that Sea Turtles needed 
to be protected and conserved and went on to note that, “*t+here had never been a 
clearer or more compelling case presented to the WTO for the conservation of an 
exhaustible natural resource or the protection of animal life or health than this 
dispute”.35  The US claimed that underlying their actions was the desire not to let 
shrimp consumption by the large US market negatively affect the dwindling sea-
turtle populations. Since local fishermen were required to harvest shrimp in a 
manner which did not adversely affect turtle populations, the US stated it saw no 
conflict in seeking to extend such a modus operandi to other shrimp headed for the 
US market.36 
To further bolster its position the US contended that no wording in the GATT 
1994 could be interpreted as precluding the adoption and enforcement, by a state, 
of measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" (Article 
XX(b)) or of measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production and consumption" (Article XX(g)). The US did accept the concomitant 
requirement that the measures were not applied arbitrarily or discriminatorily or as 
a disguised constraint on international trade, but averred that the measure it had 
taken was within the scope of Article XX (b) and (g) and thus consistent with its 
commitments under the regime.37 The US also argued that the WTO was the first 
multilateral trade organisation to be established after the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (the ‘Earth Summit’) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 
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and as such contained a commitment, in the preamble, to using the world’s 
resources in a manner compatible with sustainable development whilst still striving 
to “protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing 
so”.38 
The complainants’ position on the use of Article XX 
In response to the US position that Section 609(b) was permissible under the 
Article XX exceptions of GATT, India, Pakistan and Thailand stressed that the dispute 
was about the unilateral imposition of the US measures which they claimed were 
designed to coerce other states to adopt similar conservation policies to those of 
the US.39 They did not believe the dispute to be about conservation of sea turtles 
per se and asked the panel to find accordingly.  
The matter of jurisdiction in the application of Article XX exceptions 
The next aspect of the complainants’ case was the issue of jurisdiction.  India, 
Pakistan and Thailand posited that even though Article XX exceptions were 
ambiguous on the point of jurisdiction, when interpreted in conjunction with other 
international law instruments (like the UN Charter), as directed by Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,40 the applicability of the exceptions was 
to be circumscribed to measures taken within the jurisdiction of the US.41 In reply, 
the US raised the point that seas-turtles’ ranges were international in scope and 
therefore any limitation on the jurisdiction of conservation measures would render 
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them ineffective and therefore should not be applied.42 In addition, the US 
maintained that the jurisdiction of Article XX was not ambiguous simply because the 
wording did not explicitly include jurisdiction; ambiguity did not exist because of 
omission. Additionally, the US reminded the Panel that CITES, which all the 
complainants had ratified or acceded to,43 required them to take trade measures in 
order to conserve natural resources regardless of the  jurisdiction these may fall 
under. Thus the US claimed that it had the backing of international law in taking 
conservation measures with regards to species located in other states’ 
jurisdiction.44 
It is a feature of the DSU that any member may bring a complaint even if it 
cannot demonstrate a legal interest i.e. it was not directly or indirectly affected by 
the alleged transgression.45 Australia, Ecuador, El Salvador, the European 
Communities,46 Guatemala, Hong Kong, Japan, Nigeria, Philippines, Singapore and 
Venezuela all notified the DSB of their interest in the matter and submitted 
arguments thus becoming party to the dispute.47 They all opposed the US position. 
                                                     
42
 Panel report at 3.159, p.74 
43
 Date on which CITES in force in: India: 18/10/1976; Pakistan: 19/07/1976; Thailand: 21/04/1983; 
Malaysia: 18/01/1978; United States: 01/07/1975 - 
http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.shtml [06/03/2009] 
44
 Panel report at 3.161, p.75 
45
 Triggs, Dispute Settlement under the World Trade Organization, 49 
46














Chapter 4: The WTO dispute  
Page 84 of 126 
The Panel ruling  
Whilst finding that the US had breached its WTO obligations and applied 
quantitative restrictions – the embargo – in contravention of article XI(1),48 the 
panel went on to note in its concluding remarks that the US had the right to protect 
resources providing it did so in a manner consistent with its GATT obligations.49 It 
also noted that the ruling was not about the merits of sea-turtle preservation but 
about the GATT compatibility of the measures taken pursuant to section 609(b).50 
In the matter of jurisdiction, the panel circumvented the issue by addressing 
what it termed the ‘scope’ of the Chapeau instead. To do so it employed the 
interpretive techniques embodied in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties and deduced that the primary focus of the WTO (of which GATT 
and its Article XX exceptions form part) was economic development through trade. 
Thus it averred, the exceptions could not be used in a manner that would 
undermine the WTO’s multilateral trading system.51  In other words a measure such 
as section 609(b) would not be considered as falling within the ‘scope’ of the Article 
XX exceptions if it impinged on other states in a manner which endangered the 
multilateral trading system.52 
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The panel did not rule on the alleged infringements of Articles I(1) - MFN  - and 
XIII(1) - different application periods - as it concluded that finding the US had 
infringed the complainants’ rights in terms of Article XI(1) - quantitative restrictions 
– was sufficient remedy.53 The Panel found that the discriminate application of the 
Section 609 measures contravened the chapeau of Article XX which states that 
“such measures *should not be+ applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail”.54 Having established this the panel did not deem it 
necessary to examine the US defence under subsections (g) and (b) of Article XX as 
it had already found the US in violation of its GATT obligations.55 The panel also 
ruled that it would not accept Amicus briefs.56 
Appellate Body Report 
Disputants and their specific claims 
According to Article 16(4) of the procedures set out in the DSU, disputants are 
entitled to appeal the finding of a Panel within 60 days of the circulation of the 
Panel ruling report to the members.57 The Panel ruling - “United States - Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products - WT/DS58/R” was circulated on 
the 15th of May 1998 and on the 13th of July 1998 the United States appealed the 
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Panel ruling and sought to have it overturned. The Appellate Body presented its 
report on the 12th of October 1998.58 
The US contested two key findings of the Panel ruling. One, that non-requested 
information from NGOs (Amicus Curiae) would not be accepted as it was outside 
the remit of the DSU to do so.59 And two, that the US measures at issue constituted 
unjustifiable discrimination between goods from countries where the same 
conditions existed and therefore could not be exempted under the General 
Exceptions of Article XX.60 The analysis in the next section will concentrate on the 
second part of the ruling as it is of most relevance to this paper. 
The Appellate Body (AB) repealed the Panel’s finding on the inadmissibility of 
‘Amicus Curiae’ briefs stating that the Panel had the discretion to accept, use or 
disregard any information provided whether or not it had solicited it.61   
On the second matter – that the US measures constituted unjustifiable 
discrimination between like products - the US appealed the ruling on the following 
grounds. Firstly, that Section 609 was indeed within the scope of the Article XX 
chapeau, and clauses (g) in the first instance and (b).62 Secondly, that the Panel had 
based its findings on an incorrect interpretation of the ordinary connotation and 
context of the term "unjustifiable discrimination". The US claimed that in dealing 
with the ‘scope’ of the chapeau the Panel had created a new test, that of a "threat 
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to the multilateral trading system", which had no basis in the GATT text and which 
precluded any discriminatory measures which would normally be justifiable under 
the Article XX given the ordinary meaning of “unjustifiable discrimination”.63  
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, the Appellees, proposed that the rejection 
by the Panel of Amicus Curiae briefs should be upheld.64 Unsurprisingly the 
Appellees also claimed that the original Panel finding vis-à-vis the interpretation of 
the term "unjustifiable” did not constitute a new test but was a correct 
interpretation of the chapeau’s meaning to prevent the general exceptions being 
used for protectionist purposes.65  In addition, and leaving aside even this point, the 
Appellees claimed that the manner in which the embargoes had been applied 
constituted a sufficient erosion of their substantive GATT rights for the AB to uphold 
the Panel decision. In this regard they highlighted the lack of any attempt to 
multilaterally protect the resource, the phase-in period variation between 
Caribbean and Asian countries and lastly that the narrowness of the proposed US 
interpretation of “unjustifiable discrimination” rendered the chapeau 
meaningless.66 
The Third Participants, Australia, Ecuador, the European Communities, Hong 
Kong, China, Mexico and Nigeria, weren’t named parties to the dispute, but they did 
submit arguments to the Appellate Body. 
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Appellate Body Ruling 
While ultimately reaching the same finding on the applicability of Article XX as 
the original Panel, the Appellate Body (AB) reversed the Panel's legal interpretation 
of the proper sequence of steps in applying Article XX and analysing whether a 
member could validly invoke the exceptions. The proper sequence of steps it ruled, 
was to first assess whether a measure could be provisionally justified by one of the 
categories under paragraphs (a)-(j), and, then, to further appraise the same 
measure under the Article XX chapeau.67 The specifics of the ruling are dealt with in 
more depth below. 
The US relied primarily on the Article XX (g) exception – and only invoked (b) 
should (g) not be applicable, thus the AB, in finding that the Section 609 was indeed 
justifiable under (g) did not consider the arguments relating to Article XX (b).68  
The AB ruled that the Section 609 met the requirements of the Article XX(g) 
exception – Sea-Turtles were exhaustible natural resources,69 the measure related 
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources70 and was applied in 
conjunction with domestic restrictions.71 This effectively overturned the Panel’s 
ruling that Section 609 (the US measure) “was not within the scope of measures 
permitted under the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994”. This seemingly odd 
statement (given that the AB later also finds the measure inconsistent with the 
chapeau) reflects the Appellate Body’s rejection of the interpretative sequencing 
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applied by the Panel. From a legal standpoint, the AB thus rejects the outcome from 
the ‘chapeau-down’ approach applied by the Panel and finds that Section 609 is 
provisionally justifiable under Article XX (g)– potentially meaning that unilateral 
measures based on PPMs are not per se GATT incompatible providing they also 
meet the provisos of the chapeau.72 
The use of Article XX exceptions, however, is also subject to the application of 
the provisions of the chapeau; specifically “that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or [be] a disguised restriction 
on international trade”.73 The AB ruled that the Section 609 measure failed to 
comply with two of the chapeau’s three requirements, namely that the measures 
not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.74 The AB found 
that the measure constituted an unjustifiable restriction on international trade 
because the US had effectively set itself up the unilateral arbiter of good practice 
relating to the use of TEDs when it required that all other states adopt essentially 
the same (not similar) comprehensive regulatory policies, i.e. bring their own 
policies in line with the US policies, and be certified as having such by the US in 
order to export shrimp to the US75. Furthermore the AB found that the US had not 
consistently pursued the same objectives through diplomatic channels,76 and had 
applied different phase-in periods and levels of technology transfer to different 
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countries,77 all of which created an unjustifiable restriction according to the AB. The 
AB ruled that Section 609 constituted arbitrary discrimination because of the 
rigidity and inflexibility of the certification program it required: the certification 
process which potential exporters had to undergo was seemingly haphazard and 
unpredictable, lacking in fairness and transparency regarding technical 
requirements or even the reasoning behind denial of certification.78  
Having found that Section 609 constituted both unjustifiable and arbitrary 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevailed, the AB did 
not deem it necessary to analyse whether it might also constitute a disguised 
restriction on international trade (the chapeau’s third proviso). In summary, the 
Article XX(g) exception is a limited and conditional exemption from the usual GATT 
obligations which is only available if the invoking member complies with the 
requirements of the chapeau. Section 609 was found to be provisionally compliant 
with the requirements of Article XX (g), but not compliant with the chapeau of 
Article XX and so the measure was found to be GATT inconsistent.  
Reactions and conclusions 
The Shrimp-Turtle Case has been heralded by some writers, like Howard Chang 
and Marc Williams, as a significant jurisprudential step towards more inclusive 
treatment of environmental trade measures.79 Both have interpreted the Appellate 
Body’s ruling as an indication that the use  of unilateral import bans to support 
domestic environmental legislation would not be automatically overruled providing 
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the application thereof was not arbitrary or discriminatory.80 The Appellate Body’s 
decision not to overturn the lower panel’s finding was criticised by more 
environmentally inclined writers as once again indicating the WTO’s prioritisation of 
trade issues over environmental protection. However, some environmental 
lawyers81 and the Appellate Body itself82 emphasized that the findings addressed 
only the application and not the substance of the US environmental statutes and 
measures thereto pursuant.  
Furthermore the Appellate Body affirmed that the order of interpretation was 
important. First, panels should assess whether any measures or policies under 
dispute can be justified under any of the specific Article XX exceptions of (a) to (j) 
and then only apply the chapeau’s provisos.83 This sequencing is crucial because 
besides being a more literal reading of the text it theoretically allows for a broader 
application of the Article XX exceptions.84 This point has been criticised by some 
writers as proof that the AB was engaging in judicial lawmaking by ‘changing the 
goalposts’85 and going too far in favour of environmental protection. The 
government of India – even though it was on the ‘winning side’ – believed the AB 
ruling would allow future application of trade measures based on PPMs. Thailand 
concurred and went as far as to say that the ruling had fundamentally altered the 
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balance of rights and obligations of the Members under the regime86 by allowing 
measures inconsistent with GATT to be justified under the rubric of Article XX. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This paper applied regime theory in order to underpin a macro-level analysis of 
why states interact in a particular manner in international trade disputes involving 
marine based environmental exceptions. This chapter will highlight the most salient 
points from the preceding chapters and then synthesize the concepts and ideas 
presented in order to answer the question posed in the first chapter of how the 
treatment of marine-based Article XX trade disputes has differed between the GATT 
& WTO. 
The two disputes analysed in this paper have several things in common beyond 
being environmental disputes dealing with matters of the global commons. Both 
the Tuna-Dolphin cases (treated as one case study) and the Shrimp-Turtle cases (the 
panel report being adopted only in conjunction with the AB report) were initiated 
by embargoes placed on an importer’s products pursuant to domestic 
environmental policies to reduce ‘bycatch’; both thus raise the question of the 
application of one country’s domestic environmental policies to products from 
another country. Furthermore both highlight the issue of Process and Production 
Methods (PPMs) - the question of whether it is permissible to implement a trade 
measure (like an embargo) based on how a product is harvested/produced or 
manufactured (PPM) and not the qualities of end product. Both highlight the 
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country to employ policy in pursuit of domestically desired environmental goals and 
the obligations of each country to its partners in the multilateral trading regime.1 
Chapter three was a case study analysis of how the regime (GATT) treated the 
marine-based Article XX trade dispute between Mexico and the United States. The 
dispute was declared by Mexico in reaction to the application of an embargo of its 
products pursuant to domestic US legislation - the MMPA. Applying the terminology 
of Krasner’s definition, Mexico accused the US of infringing the regime norm of non-
discrimination when it embargoed Mexico’s tuna products and of breaking the 
national-treatment rule by treating Mexico’s like-products differently to its own. 
Decision-making procedures are the fourth part of Krasner’s definition. This paper 
has dealt with one type of decision-making procedure – the panel findings in a 
dispute between members of the regime. Thus understanding the dispute 
resolution mechanism is a key part of understanding any regime. The GATT regime’s 
dispute resolution mechanism was ad-hoc in nature, could be drawn out by 
recalcitrant disputants and most importantly could be obstructed by one state - 
even a party to a dispute – exercising its veto right on the mechanism’s findings. In 
the first of the two Tuna-Dolphin cases, Mexico did not push for the adoption of the 
panel report even though it was in its favour, but entered into bi-lateral 
negotiations with the US instead. In part because of this the EEC instituted the 
second Tuna-Dolphin case concerning the intermediary nations embargo; this Panel 
was not adopted before the GATT 1947 was replaced with the GATT1994/WTO in 
                                                     
1
 This is neatly summed up in the Tuna-Dolphin Panel report at 3.145, p.70: “This dispute dealt with 
issues that were central to how the rules of the multilateral trading system interacted with the 











Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Page 95 of 126 
1995. Technically therefore the two Panel reports do not form part of GATT 
precedence since they were not adopted, however, this has not stopped other 
disputants referring to the cases and subsequent panels using the reasoning behind 
their findings as guidance.2 
The Tuna-Dolphin I panel found that Article XX(b) did not extend to measures 
(the embargo) intended to ‘protect human, animal or plant life’ outside of the 
jurisdiction of the country taking the measure (in this case the US). The same 
applied to measures to protect ‘exhaustible resources’ outside of a state’s 
jurisdiction for the purposes of Article XX(g).3 The Panel evinced concern that the 
extrajurisdictional interpretations of Articles XX (b) and (g) could lead to multiple 
competing conservation policies which had been unilaterally decided upon by 
member states. This would result in a bewildering array of policies from which 
member states could only deviate at the risk of losing their rights under the 
regime.4 Thus in a multilateral regime the matter of jurisdiction is of utmost 
importance given the interdependence of the members of the regime, the diffuse 
principle of sovereignty and the regime norms of non-discrimination and 
reciprocity. The Panel was careful, however, to point out that it is the measure 
taken (for which Article XX exception is claimed) that has to meet the Article XX 
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requirements, not the original policy goal.5 This Panel only implicitly recognised that 
protection of dolphin life or health was a policy that could fall under Article XX(b).6 
The Tuna-Dolphin II Panel also considered the question of jurisdiction. In the 
matter of the applicability of Article XX (g) to measures taken to protect resources 
outside the jurisdiction of the US, it could find no reason to support the first panel’s 
insistence on domestic jurisdiction; it found similarly with regard to Article XX (b).7 It 
did, however, find that measures which might fall under Article XX exceptions were 
only valid when applied extraterritorially against US nationals and vessels.8 
Notwithstanding this difference with Tuna-Dolphin I, the panel found that measures 
taken pursuant to the MMPA were taken so as to coerce other countries to change 
their harvesting/conservation policies and as such could not be considered 
"necessary" in the sense required by Article XX(b), or “primarily aimed at” in the 
sense required by Article XX(g).9 The unilateralism of the measures thus rendered 
the exceptions unavailable. It also explicitly recognised that protection of dolphin 
life or health was a policy that could fall under Article XX(b).10  Thus the Tuna-
Dolphin I panel found the embargoes pursuant to the MMPA legislation to be GATT 
inconsistent because they were not covered by the exceptions of Article XX (b), (g) 
or (d) of the General Agreement, did not constitute internal regulations covered by 
Article III and were contrary to Article XI:1.11  
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Chapter four examined how the newly formed international organization of the 
WTO handled the marine-based Article XX trade dispute between Malaysia, India, 
Pakistan and Thailand as joint complainants and the United States. The dispute was 
declared by the joint complainants in reaction to an embargo of their shrimp and 
shrimp products pursuant to domestic US legislation, specifically Section 609 of 
Public Law 101-162. The complainants argued that the embargoes on their shrimp 
and shrimp products were in contravention of their MFN rule rights under Article 
I(1), inconsistent with ban on quantitative restrictions in Article XI:1(against the 
norm of non-discrimination), and that the differential treatment meted out 
according to certification status contravened Article XIII:1 of the GATT and the 
regime norms of non-discrimination and reciprocity. The US, the Respondent, did 
not argue to any of the above but claimed that because Article XX was not subject 
to limitations of jurisdiction or location (of sea-turtles)  the Section 609 measures 
were justified under Article XX (b) and (g).  
The Shrimp-Turtle Panel addressed the matter of jurisdiction only indirectly 
through a discussion of the Article’s ‘scope’.12 It did this by applying a top down 
approach to analysis i.e. first assessing whether the measure for which Article XX 
justification was claimed met the standards of the chapeau; namely it was not 
applied in a manner which would constitute "a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail", nor was it "a 
disguised restriction on international trade". As the Panel found that the Section 
609 Measure did not meet the standards of the chapeau it didn’t go on to the 
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second step of considering whether it would be justifiable under the Article XX(g) 
subsection and found instead that it wasn’t within the ‘scope’ of Article XX.13 It 
therefore also did not make a finding on whether Turtles could be considered 
‘exhaustible natural resources’ for the purposes of Article XX(g). It echoed the Tuna-
Dolphin I panel’s concern with the seemingly inherent unilateralism of the 
environmental measures when it stated that a broader interpretation of the 
chapeau (to include those measures conditioning market access to adoption of 
environmental policies) would lead to a threat to the multilateral trading system.14 
 
The Shrimp-Turtle AB, in contrast, did find that sea-turtles could be considered 
‘exhaustible natural resources’ for the purposes of Article XX (g) as the definition 
was not limited to mineral or non-living resources.15 Most importantly for the 
purposes of this paper, it addressed the US appeal - on the question of whether 
Section 609 constituted “unjustifiable discrimination” and was therefore precluded 
from using the Article XX exceptions - by clarifying the interpretive steps which it 
hoped would be applied by future panels.  
 
Analysing whether a measure was justified under Article XX by first applying the 
chapeau would render any environmental measures which condition market access, 
automatically discriminatory.16 However, this is the essence of Article XX – that it be 
used to justify exceptions to the usual course of trade interactions within the 
                                                     
13
 Shrimp-Turtle Panel report at 7.63, p.294 
14
 Shrimp-Turtle Panel report at 7.45, p286-7 
15
 Shrimp-Turtle AB report at 128 
16
 Appellate Body report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
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regime. Thus the reversal of the interpretative sequencing of Article XX (from that 
used in the Tuna Dolphin cases and the Shrimp-Turtle Panel report) meant that 
environmental measures would not automatically be found GATT inconsistent.17 In 
so doing the AB has been charged with reversing existing jurisprudence18 and 
criticised as engaging in a form of judicial lawmaking which potentially opens the 
door for unilateral measures by members.19 Others have lauded the move, calling it 
a ‘radical step’20 which more clearly delineates the procedure with which Article XX 
should be analysed and provides a clear approach to balancing trade-environment 
disputes and issues.21  
 
Dispute outcomes: a sea-change ‘in’ or ‘of’ the regime? 
The question posed by this paper was how the treatment of Article XX, marine-
based disputes differed between the GATT and the WTO. Given the preceding case 
analyses there are two ways to answer this question.  
To see differences in the treatment of the disputes between GATT and the WTO, 
it is necessary to look beyond the obvious broader brush-strokes of the outcomes to 
the finer details of the reasoning behind the decisions to see how they may have 
changed. 
                                                     
17
 Robert Howse, ‘The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for 
the Trade and Environment Debate’, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 27.2(2002), 491-
522 (p.500) 
18
 Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO’: International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-), 77.1 (Jan., 2001), 15-29 (p.28)  
19
 John H. Jackson, ‘Comments On Shrimp/Turtle And The Product/Process Distinction’, European 
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The Shrimp-Turtle panel found the Section 609 measures to be quantitative 
restrictions (of the kind prohibited by Article XI22) because it had also found the 
embargo could not be justified under the Article XX exceptions because it did not 
meet the non-discrimination standards embodied in the chapeau.23 The Panel was 
concerned that allowing such measures would raise the spectre of unilateralism 
within the regime as it would undermine the autonomy of member states to set 
their own policies without contravening other members’ policies during the course 
international trade.24 The AB decision to reverse the Panel’s interpretive sequencing 
when applying Article XX (subsections first and then chapeau), indicates a 
willingness to countenance that environmental measures, by their very nature, may 
require discriminatory actions on the part of regime members.25 The discriminatory 
action in this instance was the US making access to its markets conditional on 
exporting countries adopting a sea-turtle conservation and regulatory program (use 
of TEDs) it had effectively prescribed. The AB found that this type of action would 
not necessarily render a measure a priori unjustifiable under the Article XX 
exceptions – applying the interpretive sequencing used by the Panel, however, 
would have found precisely that.26  
This is a potentially significant jurisprudential step for the use of environmental 
measures and represents a departure from the Tuna-Dolphin decisions. In the first 
Tuna-Dolphin decision the MMPA’s direct and the intermediary embargoes were 
automatically considered GATT inconsistent because the embargoes for which XX 
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 Shrimp-Turtle Panel at 7.17 
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 Shrimp-Turtle Panel report at 7.49 
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 Shrimp-Turtle Panel report at 7.51 
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(g)27 and (b) justification was sought were applied outside of the jurisdiction of the 
country taking the measure. The Shrimp-Turtle AB, however, left open the question 
of whether an extraterritorially applied environmental measure, based on a PPM for 
instance, might be justifiable under the Article XX exceptions if it were applied in 
manner which met the provisos of the chapeau and did not represent a means of 
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail" or a "disguised restriction on international trade."28 
Changes have been identified in the manner in which disputes are dealt with: 
the WTO DSU process is more clearly defined and automatic than the GATT dispute 
resolution process was and includes strict timelines and procedures which must be 
adhered to in the normal course of a dispute. As one commentator put it, the 
“GATT dispute resolution process has, in short, been “juridified” under the WTO”.29 
As a standing body of experts, the Appellate Body of the WTO is tasked to address 
any issues of law which arise from Panel rulings and to make judgements on the 
interpretation the law of the WTO.30 This the AB did in the Shrimp - Turtle dispute 
by overturning the interpretive sequencing of Article XX employed by the Panel. 
Writers have suggested that the WTO represents a bureaucracy with its own 
‘agenda’,31 and the AB in turn, not a neutral judge but one that considers its own 
interests and shapes its judgements accordingly.32 In this way the decisions of the 
                                                     
27
 Tuna-Dolphin I at 5.32 
28
 Sampson, Trade, Environment, and the WTO, 109 
29
 Triggs, Dispute Settlement under the World Trade Organization, 47 
30
 WTO, Dispute Settlement Understanding, Article 17(6) 
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AB might actually have an impact on the principles and norms of the underlying 
regime – sufficient to change the nature of the regime itself. The change of the 
decision-making procedure (the introduction of the more judicial Appellate Body) 
might have facilitated changes in the principles and norms through enhancing the 
process of judicial interpretation. Thus if the reversal of the interpretative 
sequencing of Article XX is a radical as some writers have suggested33 and has as far-
reaching implications for justifying unilateral action based on PPMs as both India 
and Thailand suggested,34 then perhaps it may be considered a change of the 
fundamental norm of non-discrimination and the diffuse principle of sovereignty 
and as such an alteration of the regime itself. Nevertheless it should be noted that 
the DSB is but one type of decision-making within the WTO and that during trade 
negotiations (another type of decision-making procedure) many WTO members 
have resisted making significant changes to the rights and obligations of the GATT 
that would permit environmental measures, eschewing even the conservative case-
by-case changes the AB’s interpretive approach offers.35 
From a broader perspective, however, the outcome of the disputes has differed 
little between the regime and the WTO as the environmental measures imposed 
(the MMPA embargos and the Section (609) embargo) were found to be GATT 
inconsistent and construed instead as unilateral attempts to coerce other states 
into changing their environmental policies through the use of economic embargoes 
based on PPMs. Notwithstanding the preamble’s commitment to sustainable 
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development, the WTO has been severely criticised for its perceived prioritization of 
trade over environmental considerations. For example, the Earth Island Institute 
(the US NGO whose domestic law suits precipitated both disputes) called the AB’s 
decision a, “death-blow to sea-turtles”.36   
This perceived lack of difference between the treatment of the disputes may be 
accounted for by returning to Krasner’s definition of regimes. In his seminal paper - 
‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’ - 
Stephen Krasner draws a distinction between the principles and norms of a regime 
and its rules and procedures. Principles and norms, he states, are the defining 
characteristics of a regime, thus any changes to these actually change the regime. 
Rules and decision-making procedures on the other hand may be changed without 
fundamentally altering the very nature of the regime.37 Therefore the similarity in 
the ‘anti-environment’ outcome of both of these disputes may indicate that the 
principles and norms of the regime have persisted and the addition of the WTO 
bureaucracy has only changed the rules and procedures; as such there is not a 
fundamental change in the regime, but rather a change within the regime. 
Thus the answer to the question posed by the paper is highly dependent on 
level of nuance inherent in the interpretation of the respective outcomes. If the 
Shrimp-Turtle AB Report – and specifically its findings vis-à-vis the interpretive 
sequencing of Article XX exceptions – is interpreted as the beginning of a trend 
                                                     
36
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toward unilateralism it would indicate a potential change in the principles and 
norms of the regime which underpins WTO and thus a change of the regime itself. 
If, however, the report is interpreted merely as another step in the process of the 
evolution of WTO/GATT 1994 jurisprudence, then the regime itself persists as the 
change has occurred within it at the level of rules and decision-making procedures. 
Answering that question definitively requires further disputes in order to see how 
the AB’s finding on interpretive sequencing is used by subsequent DSU Panels to 
resolve similar Article XX marine-based disputes; and to see how decisions 
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Appendix 1: Article XX (General Exceptions) 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
(a) … 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(c) … 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to 
customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 
of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, 
and the prevention of deceptive practices; 
(e) … 
(f) … 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
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Appendix 2: The Purse-seine fishing method 
This method of operation can comprise either a single vessel – a purse seiner – 
or a two boat combination for larger operations. Upon finding an aggregation of 
pelagic fish – either through spotting herds of dolphin, or surface water 
disturbance, or the use of sonar1, for example – a purse seine net is set upon the 
school of fish. In larger, commercial operations the seine ‘skiff’ (usually a 
motorboat) guides and unfurls the net around the school of fish before returning to 









Figure 1: The Purse-seine net in the ocean
3
 
                                                     
1
 http://www.fao.org/fishery/geartype/249 [22/01/2009] 
2
 Tuna-Dolphin I Panel report, p.2, at 2.1 
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The net, which can be hundreds of metres deep and several miles long, is then 
“pursed” by drawing the bottom of the net tightly together using the pursing wire – 
see image below.  
 
Figure 2: The principal net sections and ropes for a purse-seine
4
 
The top wire, termed the floatwire, is then also drawn together to capture 
whatever is trapped in the purse5. It is at this point that many dolphins are killed as 
they are trapped under the water and eventually drown6. 
 
                                                     
4 
Image source http://www.fao.org/fishery/geartype/249  [22/01/2009] 
5
 Tuna-Dolphin I Panel report, p.2, at 2.1 
6
 FAO. © 2001-2009. Fishing Gear Types. Purse seines. In: FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department 
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Appendix 3: The GATT-zilla cartoon. 
This drawing/cartoon first appeared as a poster in Washington DC, USA, in 1994 
after the Tuna-Dolphin I GATT ruling and encapsulates the pro-environment/anti-
trade public perception  
 
Figure 3: The GATT-zilla cartoon
7
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Appendix 4:  
Excerpts from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Article 31  
General rule of interpretation 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, 
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties. 
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Article 32. 
Supplementary means of interpretation 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstance of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine 
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
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Appendix 5: Sea Turtles8  
Family: Dermochelyidae 
 
Leatherback (Dermochelys coriacea)   
Critically Endangered  
The largest of all turtles, the leatherback can reach over six 
feet in length and weigh over 2,000 pounds (907 kg). 
Leatherbacks swim the greatest distances and regularly dive to 
depths greater than 1,000 meters (3,281 feet). Unlike the plated 
shells and scaled surfaces of the other sea turtles, the 
leatherback's shell is a single piece with five distinct ridges. 
Family: Cheloniidae 
 
Kemp’s Ridley (Lepidochelys kempii)  
Critically Endangered  
The Kemp’s Ridley is the smallest of the sea turtles and 
has a very restricted range, nesting only along the Caribbean 
shores of northern Mexico and in Texas, USA. Fifty years ago 
the Kemp’s Ridley was near extinction. This species now(as at 
2008) shows signs of recovery, although much work remains 
before it can be considered "in the clear." 
 
Hawksbill  (Eretmochelys imbricata)  
Critically Endangered  
Named for its sharp, pointed beak, the hawksbill feeds 
primarily on reef sponges, invertebrate organisms whose 
bodies contain indigestible glass spicules. The hawksbill has a 
beautiful, translucent shell, which has been used in 
tortoiseshell jewellery for centuries, which has contributed to 
their sharp population declines in recent decades. 
                                                     
8
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Green (Chelonia mydas)  
Endangered 
The most widespread of the seven species, the green sea 
turtle earns its name from the colour of its body fat. Its 
cartilage, called calipee, is the main ingredient in green turtle 
soup, once highly sought in Europe. Though now illegal to trade 
in many areas of the world, the green turtle and its eggs 
continue to be consumed by many coastal peoples. 
 
Loggerhead (Caretta caretta)  
Endangered  
Loggerheads are named for their large heads, with jaws 
powerful enough to crush an adult queen conch. Like most sea 
turtles, loggerheads are famed for their vast migrations; for 
instance, loggerheads that mate and nest in Japan regularly 
cross the Pacific to feed in Mexican waters. 
 
Olive Ridley (Lepidochelys olivacea)  
Endangered  
Olive Ridleys are the most abundant of the sea turtles. 
These turtles nest synchronously en masse in a phenomena 
known as an arribada, Spanish for “arrival.” At their largest 
nesting population in Orissa, India, hundreds of thousands of 
females nest each year. 
 
 
Flatback (Natator depressus)  
Data Deficient (Status Unknown)  
The flatback is the least studied of the sea turtles and has 
one of the smallest geographic ranges. Although they travel into 
adjacent national waters, flatbacks stay within a relatively small 
area around northern Australia, southern Indonesia and 
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Appendix 6: The shrimp trawler & the Turtle Excluder Device 
 
The TED is one of a number of Bycatch Reduction Technologies employed in the 
shrimping industry to reduce the problem of bycatch (marine animals incidentally 
captured) and make the industry both more environmentally sound and 
economically efficient. The TED is an angled hatch or grating in the net through 
which turtles may escape when caught in the net as it is pulled behind a boat.  
Shrimp and prawns are small enough to pass between the bars and are directed 




Figure 4: Turtle Excluder Device in a trawl net
10
 
                                                     
9
 http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/turtles/teds.htm  
10
 Image source: http://www.arbec.com.my/sea-turtles/art34julysept01.htm 
 ARBEC is the “ASEAN Review of Biodiversity and Environmental Conservation” 
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Appendix 7: Sea-Turtles as form of protest 
 
 












“Why We Marched as Turtles. 
At the WTO meeting in Seattle, AWI helped 
lead 240 people dressed as sea turtles in protest 
against the WTO’s rejection of U.S. law requiring 
turtle excluder devices on boats of any country 
wishing to export shrimp to America.  Several 
countries refused employing these inexpensive 
devices, insisting that our law unfairly restricted 
trade. The WTO struck down our law. … The 
turtles have been a tremendous hit—symbolically protesting the WTO’s usurpation 
of American sovereignty, including enforcement of our animal protection laws, and 
the ecological destruction wrought by the World Bank and IMF.” 




 http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/1999/11/29/mckibben-wto/  
 
Figure 7: Sea turtles march against the 
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